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ESCAPING DOCTRINAL LOCKBOXES IN
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE:
WORKAROUNDS FOR STRICT SCRUTINY
FOR LOW-VALUE SPEECH IN THE FACE
OF STEVENS AND REED
Clay Calvert*

ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court’s 2010 opinion in the crush-video case
of United States v. Stevens made it extremely difficult to declare new varieties of low-value speech unprotected by the First Amendment. Five years
later, the Court’s sign-ordinance ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert made it
exceedingly tough for facially content-based regulations imposed on presumptively protected speech to be analyzed by any standard of judicial review less rigorous than the demanding strict scrutiny test. This Article
examines how some courts today, despite being hemmed in by the strictures
of both Stevens and Reed, are creatively unearthing novel ways to apply
more lenient levels of review to content-based laws targeting varieties of
speech—in particular, revenge pornography and conversion therapy—that
seemingly carry trifling value for furthering traditional First Amendment
ideals. Those time-honored goals addressed in this Article include promoting democratic self-governance and facilitating truth discovery in the metaphorical marketplace of ideas. The Article asserts that rather than resorting
to artful efforts to dodge both Reed and a rigid categorical approach to
First Amendment analysis, lower courts should boldly embrace Justice
Breyer’s values-and-interests methodology for proportionate scrutiny in
these cases. This, in turn, would tee up for possible Supreme Court reconsideration Reed and, conceivably, even Stevens. Significantly, as the Article explains, Justice Breyer advocated in 2019 for this approach in the lowvalue speech case of Iancu v. Brunetti involving the trademark “FUCT.”
This bolsters the argument for its applicability when it comes to analyzing
laws barring the low-value expression of revenge pornography and conversion therapy.
* Professor of Law, Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida in
Gainesville, Florida. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the
Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. The author thanks student Alexandra Newman for her careful
review of a draft of this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

N October 2019, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in People v. Austin1 that a state statute2 criminalizing the nonconsensual dissemination of certain private, sexual images was a content-neutral law
subject to constitutional analysis under the intermediate scrutiny standard.3 This tier of review comports with the notion that, in recent decades, “some version of intermediate scrutiny has been consistently used
in cases involving content-neutral time, manner, and place restrictions.”4
1. 2019 IL 123910, petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1029 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2020).
2. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5(b) (2020).
3. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 43 (“We conclude that section 11-23.5(b) is subject to an
intermediate level of scrutiny for two independent reasons. First, the statute is a contentneutral time, place, and manner restriction. Second, the statute regulates a purely private
matter.”).
4. Dustin B. Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First Amendment in Protective-Order Litigation, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1813 (2014); see David S. Han, Transparency in First
Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 368 (2015) (noting that the “default rule” is that
“the intermediate scrutiny standard applie[s] to content-neutral speech restrictions”).
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In the face of a First Amendment free speech challenge to the statute in
Austin, Illinois’s highest court ultimately upheld the statute under this
generally deferential level of appraisal.5
There is, however, a glaring problem with this decision. It is that the
Illinois statute discriminates on its face against a particular type of content; the Supreme Court of Illinois majority readily acknowledged this
fact.6 In particular, the law targets only images depicting a person “engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed.”7 Visuals
showing other subjects or topics, including people who are not participating in such deeds and whose intimate parts are covered, are not constrained by the measure.8 This discrepancy between what content is and is
not regulated by the statute is highly significant. It means that under the
United States Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,9
the Illinois statute is facially content based because it “draws distinctions
based on the message a speaker conveys”10 and defines “regulated speech
by [a] particular subject matter.”11
The ramifications, in turn, of this facial, content-based categorization
are profound for dictating the applicable level of First Amendment scrutiny for statutory analysis.12 Per Reed, the Illinois statute should have
5. See Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 86 (“We hold that section 11-23.5 satisfies intermediate scrutiny.”); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 194 (4th ed. 2014)
(“[T]he Court’s review of time, place, and manner restrictions normally is not particularly
vigorous.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious
Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1260 (2008) (asserting that the intermediate scrutiny test, as
it has evolved over time, “often present[s] the government with only minor impediments—
mere speed bumps along the path to suppression of even core political speech”).
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-five years ago
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties applicable for governing the actions of state and local government entities and officials. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[F]reedom of speech and of the press—
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among
the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”).
6. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 46 (“We recognize that section 11-23.5(b) on its face
targets the dissemination of a specific category of speech—sexual images.”).
7. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5(b)(1)(C) (2020). The statute defines a sexual act as
“sexual penetration, masturbation, or sexual activity.” Id. § 11-23.5(a). It explicates intimate parts as “fully unclothed, partially unclothed or transparently clothed genitals, pubic
area, anus, or if the person is female, a partially or fully exposed nipple, including exposure
through transparent clothing.” Id.
8. As the two-justice dissent in Austin explained, the statute does not make it a crime
“to disseminate a picture of a fully clothed adult man or woman,” no matter how unflattering the image might be. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 127 (Garman, J., dissenting).
9. 576 U.S. 155, 159 (2015).
10. Id. at 163.
11. Id.
12. Whether a law is content based or content neutral is critical in First Amendment
jurisprudence in terms of influencing the level of scrutiny to which it will be subjected by a
court. As one professor explains the usual methodology:
After distinguishing content-based from content-neutral laws, the Court
must give each its appropriate level of review. This is the scrutiny analysis.
Content-based laws receive strict scrutiny, which nearly always proves fatal.
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been examined under the more rigorous strict scrutiny standard—not intermediate scrutiny—regardless of any benign legislative motive or purpose underlying it.13 As Justice Thomas bluntly explained in penning the
Court’s opinion in Reed, “an innocuous justification cannot transform a
facially content-based law into one that is content neutral.”14 In other
words, there simply is no need under Reed to examine the legislative motive once a statute is determined to be facially content based; facially content-based laws must clear strict scrutiny to be constitutional.15
The application of strict scrutiny to content-based laws, in turn, typically tolls the death knell for such legislative handiwork.16 That is because
strict scrutiny represents “the most searching form of judicial review in
free speech cases.”17 It requires the government to prove both that it has
a compelling interest to justify the law in question and that the means
Meanwhile, content-neutral laws receive what the Court calls “intermediate
scrutiny,” in practice a highly deferential form of review which virtually all
laws pass.
Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 237 (2012) (footnote omitted).
13. Reed, 576 U.S. at 165 (“A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict
scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack
of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.” (quoting Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993))); see also Genevieve Lakier, Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP.
CT. REV. 233, 233 (“For decades now, the Supreme Court has insisted that content-based
laws—laws that restrict speech because of its ideas or messages or subject matter—are
presumptively unconstitutional, and will be sustained only if they can satisfy strict
scrutiny.”).
14. Reed, 576 U.S. at 166; see Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. REV. 65, 67 (2017) (examining Reed’s analysis of the scrutiny issue and
noting that, under it, “[e]ven a benign (or at least non-content-related) purpose cannot
save a law that refers to content from the most rigorous constitutional standard of
review”).
15. See R. Randall Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine, 52 IND. L. REV. 355, 400 (2019) (“[T]he majority in Reed adopted a rigid rule that if a
regulation is content-based ‘on its face,’ then strict scrutiny is automatically triggered.”
(quoting Reed, 576 U.S. at 165)). There are a few exceptions to this general rule, perhaps
the most notable of which involves laws targeting commercial speech. Such measures typically are analyzed under a variation of intermediate scrutiny. See Caroline Mala Corbin,
Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court differentiates between commercial speech (such as advertising) and noncommercial speech, and
subjects the former to intermediate scrutiny.”); David L. Hudson, Jr., The Content-Discrimination Principle and the Impact of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 70 CASE W. RSRV. L.
REV. 259, 272 (2019) (“[C]ommercial speech receives protection but it is still viewed as a
stepchild in the First Amendment family. All regulations of commercial speech—both content-based and content-neutral—are evaluated under the so-called Central Hudson test, a
variant of intermediate scrutiny developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1980.”).
16. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 176 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that strict scrutiny
leads “to almost certain legal condemnation”); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731
(2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (declaring that strict scrutiny results in “near-automatic
condemnation”); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 IOWA
L. REV. 1427, 1428 (2017) (describing strict scrutiny as “essentially outcome determinative;
in only one modern case has a majority of the Court unambiguously upheld a contentbased law under strict scrutiny” (footnote omitted)).
17. Matthew D. Bunker, Clay Calvert & William C. Nevin, Strict in Theory, but Feeble
in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMMC’N L. &
POL’Y 349, 350 (2011).
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serving that interest squelch no more speech than is absolutely necessary.18 As Justice Souter once tidily encapsulated it, strict scrutiny “leaves
few survivors.”19
Yet, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Austin ignored Reed’s admonition
that a facially content-based law must surmount strict scrutiny irrespective of lawmakers’ noble motives.20 Instead, Illinois’s highest court took a
substantial leap backward in time to 1989, relying on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s opinion from that year in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.21 The
Court there concluded that the legislative intent for adopting a law provided the pivotal key for deciding if it was content based or content neutral.22 In short, in Austin, the Supreme Court of Illinois followed the
outdated Ward ruling, not Reed, thus allowing it to focus on legislative
motive even when confronted with a facially content-based statute.23
Writing for the five-member Austin majority, Justice Neville quoted
Ward verbatim for dual propositions buttressing the position that intent
controls whether a law is content based or content neutral: First, “The
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement
with the message it conveys.”24 And second, “A regulation that serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even
if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others.”25
18. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (providing that strict
scrutiny requires a law to be “justified by a compelling government interest and . . . narrowly drawn to serve that interest,” and dubbing this “a demanding standard”); see also
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014) (providing that to pass strict scrutiny review
under the narrow-tailoring prong, a statute “must be the least restrictive means of achieving
a compelling state interest” (emphasis added)).
19. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (addressing how the Court in Reed held
that a facially content-based statute cannot be converted into a content-neutral one by a
good legislative purpose); see also Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed’s
Reach: Content Discrimination in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals After Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 24 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 191, 192 (2019) (“Justice Thomas’s opinion in Reed held
that facial content discrimination cannot be saved with a benign purpose. In previous cases,
the Court had stated that an innocuous government purpose could save a facially contentbased law from strict scrutiny. Reed, however, changed the calculus, stating that was not
the case.” (footnote omitted)).
21. See People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶¶ 45–46 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1029 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2020).
22. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (“The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether
the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. The government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.” (citation
omitted)).
23. See Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶¶ 45–46 (citing Ward several times and relying on it
for the proposition that a regulation may be content neutral, even if it is facially content
based, if the government adopted it to serve a goal that is unrelated to a disagreement with
the specific content being regulated).
24. Id. ¶ 45 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
25. Id. ¶ 46 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
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Justice Neville cited Reed, but only for the principle that content-based
laws must survive strict scrutiny to be constitutional.26 He failed to mention Reed’s unambiguous holding that “[a] law that is content based on its
face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, [or] content-neutral justification.”27 In a nutshell, the Austin majority found that a facially content-based law should nonetheless be deemed
content neutral and should therefore be subject to intermediate scrutiny
review.28
As if sub silentio sensing that it needed some additional cover for flouting Reed, the Supreme Court of Illinois doubled down on veering off the
beaten path of scrutiny. Specifically, it articulated a back-up, independent
justification for applying intermediate scrutiny beyond content neutrality:
the Illinois statute regulates only speech about matters of private concern, not public interest, and thus merits more deferential judicial review.29 The U.S. Supreme Court certainly has embraced a dichotomy
between matters of public and private concern, but it has done so only
when addressing the speech rights of government employees,30 as well as
when deciding whether the First Amendment shields speakers from tort
liability31 and safeguards media entities that publish lawfully obtained,

26. See id. ¶ 40 (“A content-based law is justified only if it survives strict scrutiny,
which requires the government to demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.” (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015))).
27. Reed, 576 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added).
28. See Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 43 (holding that the statute was “subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny” in part because it was “a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction”).
29. See id. ¶¶ 53–54 (concluding “that section 11-23.5(b) is subject to an intermediate
level of scrutiny also because the statute regulates a purely private matter,” and asserting
that “[F]irst [A]mendment protections are less rigorous where matters of purely private
significance are at issue”).
30. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) (“The Court’s decisions . . . have
sought both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government
employers attempting to perform their important public functions.” (emphasis added));
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (“The Court has recognized the right of
employees to speak on matters of public concern, typically matters concerning government
policies that are of interest to the public at large, a subject on which public employees are
uniquely qualified to comment.” (emphasis added)); see also Carmen Maye, Public-College
Student-Athletes and Game-Time Anthem Protests: Is There a Need for a ConstitutionalAnalytical Audible?, 24 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 55, 79 (2019) (“In public-employee speech
cases, the primary consideration is whether an employee utters the speech in connection
with his or her job—as a public employee—or is speaking ‘as a citizen upon matters of
public concern.’” (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 416)).
31. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (holding that whether the First
Amendment shielded members of the Westboro Baptist Church from tort liability based
on their offensive speech near a funeral for a U.S. soldier killed in Iraq “turn[ed] largely on
whether that speech [wa]s of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case” and noting that “where matters of purely private significance are at
issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous”); see also Erica Goldberg,
Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2163, 2169
(2018) (“[T]he public concern test dominates much of First Amendment analysis in the
speech-torts context.”).
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truthful information.32 It has never, however, invoked this on–off switch
of public-versus-private matters when determining whether intermediate
or strict scrutiny applies to analyze a statute.33
The elephant-in-the-room question that thus arises—the one animating
this Article—is why the Supreme Court of Illinois ignored Reed’s brightline rule and, instead, latched on to Ward, which focused on legislative
intent. This Article hypothesizes that the Illinois Supreme Court, like
some other courts in 2019 confronting similar issues,34 might have done
so because: (1) the statute at issue regulated decidedly low-value
speech,35 and (2) the court needed to find an escape hatch from the strictures of both Reed and the Court’s 2010 decision in United States v. Stevens36 in order to increase the odds of the statute passing constitutional
muster.
Stevens made it much more challenging for courts to hold that a new
variety of speech—known as nonconsensual, or revenge, pornography37
32. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533–34 (2001) (holding that enforcement of
a federal statute banning the dissemination of the contents of a conversation that was illegally intercepted was not justified on the facts of the case because “enforcement of that
provision . . . implicate[d] the core purposes of the First Amendment because it impose[d]
sanctions on the publication of truthful information of public concern” (emphasis added));
Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (“[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest
of the highest order.” (emphasis added)); see also Adam Candeub, Nakedness and Publicity, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1767 (2019) (“Bartnicki ruled the First Amendment prohibits
laws outlawing dissemination of speech—acquired by a third-party wiretapper—if of public
concern.”).
33. The Court, instead, focuses on whether the regulation is content neutral or content
based. Professor Genevieve Lakier explains that
[t]he distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of
speech is one of the most important in First Amendment law. For decades
now, the Supreme Court has insisted that content-based laws—laws that restrict speech because of its ideas or messages or subject matter—are presumptively unconstitutional, and will be sustained only if they can satisfy
strict scrutiny. In contrast, content-neutral laws—laws that regulate speech
for some reason other than its content—are reviewed under a lesser, and
often quite deferential, standard.
Lakier, supra note 13, at 233 (footnote omitted).
34. See infra Section IV.B (addressing two cases where courts avoided the application
of strict scrutiny when confronted with seemingly content-based laws regulating the lowvalue speech of sexual orientation change efforts).
35. See infra notes 76–86 and accompanying text (addressing the concept of low-value
speech and the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of that concept in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), as a rationale for holding that the regulation of some
types of speech “have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”).
36. 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).
37. See People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 17 (observing that the Illinois statute “addresses the problem of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images, which is
colloquially referred to as ‘revenge porn’”), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1029 (U.S. Feb.
14, 2020); see also Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front
Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (2017) (defining nonconsensual pornography as “sexually explicit images and video disclosed without consent and for no legitimate purpose,”
and noting that “[m]any victim advocates” prefer to use the term nonconsensual pornography instead of “revenge porn”); Jessica A. Magaldi, Jonathan S. Sales & John Paul, Revenge Porn: The Name Doesn’t Do Nonconsensual Pornography Justice and the Remedies
Don’t Offer the Victims Enough Justice, 98 OR. L. REV, 197, 199, 203 (2020) (defining
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(this Article uses the terms interchangeably), which was targeted in Austin—falls outside the bounds of First Amendment protection.38 Specifically, Stevens flatly rejected the government’s position that novel
categories of unguarded speech are identifiable “on the basis of a simple
cost-benefit analysis”39 that balances the “relative social costs and benefits”40 of protecting the speech in question and deems some speech utterly valueless or not worth protecting.41 Writing for the Stevens majority,
Chief Justice Roberts did not, however, slam the door shut on recognizing
new varieties of unprotected expression.42 He determined that a historyand-tradition methodology must be applied in order to identify possible
new categories, reasoning that “[m]aybe there are some categories of
speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been
specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.”43
This approach, as former American Civil Liberties Union President
Nadine Strossen encapsulates it, “is essentially backward-looking, treating the finite exceptions that had been generally accepted since the First
Amendment’s adoption as a closed, fixed set of all such exceptions.”44
This thwarts “the possibility of carving out from First Amendment protection any expression that had been protected historically.”45 Similarly,
Professor Genevieve Lakier notes that under the accepted view of Stevens, “historical evidence of a ‘long-settled tradition of subjecting that
nonconsensual pornography as “a user-generated image of a person in a state of nudity or
engaged in sexually explicit conduct in a state of nudity that is distributed to third parties
without the consent of the person depicted in the photograph or video and without a legitimate purpose,” and characterizing revenge porn as a “category of nonconsensual pornography” in which “a previous romantic partner distributes the offending material”).
38. The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that multiple varieties of speech generally
are noprotected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717
(2012) (plurality opinion) (listing unprotected brands of expression as including incitement
to violence, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words,
child pornography, fraud, true threats and “speech presenting some grave and imminent
threat the government has the power to prevent”). The Court’s “plurality opinion in Alvarez represents [its] most recent effort to catalog categories of unprotected speech.” G. Edward White, Falsity and the First Amendment, 72 SMU L. REV. 513, 517 (2019). Before
Alvarez, the Court had enumerated unprotected categories of speech in other opinions.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“As a general principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or read or
speak or hear. The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories
of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with
real children.” (emphasis added)).
39. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.
40. Id. at 470.
41. See id. (“The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people
that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is
not worth it.”).
42. See id. at 472 (“We need not foreclose the future recognition of such additional
categories to reject the Government’s highly manipulable balancing test as a means of
identifying them.”).
43. Id.
44. Nadine Strossen, United States v. Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales for
Content-Based Speech Restrictions, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67, 81.
45. Id. at 82.
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speech to regulation’ is required to establish the existence of a novel category of low-value speech.”46 As applied in Stevens, this approach led the
Court to refuse to adopt images of animal cruelty as a new category of
unprotected expression.47
The next year, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,48 the Court
applied the same Stevens approach for ferreting out niches of unprotected
speech when it considered the constitutionality of a California statute
limiting minors’ access to violent video games.49 The Court found that
there was no historical tradition in the United States of banning minors’
access to speech describing or depicting violence.50 The California statute
thus “impose[d] a restriction on the content of protected speech,” and it
had to overcome the strict scrutiny test in order to be constitutional.51
This was a high hurdle that the statute could not clear.52 The Court again
reaffirmed the Stevens methodology in 2012 in United States v. Alvarez.53
Viewed collectively, the Stevens, Brown, and Alvarez approach for fashioning new categories of unprotected speech represents what Professor
Chad Flanders calls “a sort of ‘back to the future’ in First Amendment
law.”54
The Supreme Court of Illinois in Austin, in fact, was hemmed in by
both Stevens and Reed. In particular, the Prairie State’s high court cited
Stevens when noting that the U.S. Supreme Court “has permitted content-based restrictions where [the restrictions are] confined to the few
historic, traditional, and long-familiar categories of expression.”55 It declined, however, “to identify a new categorical [F]irst [A]mendment exception when the United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
question” of constitutional protection (or lack thereof) for the nonconsensual dissemination of private, sexual images.56 In doing so, it noted
that earlier in 2019, the Supreme Court of Vermont had also refused to
carve out a new category of unprotected expression under Stevens for
such speech when considering the constitutionality of that state’s statute
46. Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166,
2169 (2015) (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469).
47. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
48. 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
49. See id. at 788–89. The Brown majority deemed Stevens controlling precedent. Id. at
792.
50. See id. at 795 (“California’s argument would fare better if there were a longstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence, but there is none.”).
51. Id. at 799.
52. See id. (“California cannot meet that standard.”).
53. 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion). The Court in Alvarez cited approvingly Stevens’s history-and-tradition test. See id. at 717 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460, 468 (2010)). It then refused to carve out an unprotected category of expression
for false speech. See id. at 722 (rejecting “the notion that false speech should be in a general category that is presumptively unprotected”).
54. Chad Flanders, A Half-Hearted Defense of the Categorical Approach, 95 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1389, 1402 (2018).
55. People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 34 (citing Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717; Stevens, 559
U.S. at 468, 470), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1029 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2020).
56. Id. ¶ 36.
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targeting nonconsensual pornography.57
In short, the Supreme Court of Illinois was reticent under Stevens—and
without additional guidance from the nation’s highest court—to fashion a
novel class of unprotected expression for nonconsensual pornography. In
turn, because such speech was presumptively protected, the court had to
apply a standard of review to analyze the constitutional validity of the
statute before it and, as noted earlier, the court adopted intermediate
scrutiny as the proper test.58 This flatly contradicted Reed’s command
that facially content-based laws must survive strict scrutiny.59
Pulling the analytical camera back from a tight focus on Austin, the big
picture revealed is this: Stevens and Reed pack a profoundly powerful
one–two categorical punch in First Amendment jurisprudence. Stevens
strikes the first blow, making it difficult for courts to carve out new categories of unprotected expression, especially when the speech only recently—not traditionally and historically—has been targeted by
lawmakers for regulation and criminalization. Reed then follows up and
lands the second wallop, rendering it tough for courts to apply a standard
of review less burdensome than strict scrutiny once a statute is categorized as facially content based. Legislation banishing or restricting lowvalue speech thus can be knocked out, left lying on the canvas, unless it
surmounts strict scrutiny or a wily court invents a way to elude the doctrinal lockboxes of Stevens and Reed.
This Article, focusing on Austin as well as two 2019 opinions addressing
the First Amendment implications of laws banning conversion therapy—
also called sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE)60—on minors, explores how some courts are shrewdly finding ways to apply standards of
57. Id. (citing State v. VanBuren, 2018 VT 95 ¶ 46, 210 Vt. 293, 214 A.3d 791, 807
(2019)). In State v. VanBuren, Vermont’s highest appellate court “le[ft] it to the Supreme
Court in the first instance to designate nonconsensual pornography as a new category of
speech that falls outside the First Amendment’s full protections.” 2018 VT 95, ¶ 46, 210 Vt.
293, 214 A.3d at 807. The Supreme Court of Vermont also cited the test from Stevens,
noting that the U.S. Supreme Court there “focused particularly on the absence of any
history of regulating such depictions, rather than the policy arguments for and against embracing the proposed new category.” Id. ¶ 30, 210 Vt. 293, 214 A.3d at 802 (citing Stevens,
559 U.S. at 469). Ultimately, it held “that ‘revenge porn’ does not fall within an established
categorical exception to full First Amendment protection, and . . . decline[d] to predict that
the U.S. Supreme Court would recognize a new category.” Id. ¶ 22, 210 Vt. 293, 214 A.3d
at 800.
58. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 6–15 and accompanying text (addressing how the law at issue in
Austin was content based on its face and how, per Reed, such laws must survive strict
scrutiny to pass First Amendment muster).
60. As a June 2019 report prepared by the Williams Institute at UCLA Law School
encapsulates it:
Conversion therapy, also known as sexual orientation or gender identity
change efforts, is a practice grounded in the belief that being LGBT is abnormal. It is intended to change the sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression of LGBT people. Conversion therapy is practiced by some
licensed professionals in the context of providing health care and by some
clergy or other spiritual advisors in the context of religious practice. Efforts
to change someone’s sexual orientation or gender identity are associated
with poor mental health, including suicidality. As of June 2019, 18 states, the
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review less arduous than strict scrutiny when analyzing statutes targeting
such decidedly low-value speech. Indeed, revenge pornography is not
only generally low value but also, in fact, often extremely harmful. As
Professors Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne Franks explain, victims
of revenge pornography suffer “grave harms” such as “stalking, loss of
professional and educational opportunities, and psychological damage.”61
Furthermore, as Citron recently pointed out, the nonconsensual dissemination of such images “invades sexual privacy by preventing victims from
determining for themselves who sees them naked.”62 She asserts that
“[n]ude photos, posted for the public to see, reduce people to their genitalia and breasts. When nonconsensual pornography is perpetrated by an
ex-intimate, the betrayal of trust is profound.”63
In terms of value, or lack thereof, speech efforts to change the sexual
orientation of minors might well be similarly considered. Specifically, and
according to some studies and learned organizations, conversion therapy
not only lacks any value but also may harm those who undergo it.64 In
November 2018, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) “reiterate[d] its long-standing opposition to the practice.”65 In doing so, the
APA called conversion therapy a “harmful and discriminatory practice.”66 In a 2019 issue brief, the American Medical Association (AMA)
pointed out that conversion therapy may “increase suicidal behaviors in a
population where suicide is prevalent,” namely LGBTQ young adults.67
The AMA added that “[a]ll leading professional medical and mental
health associations reject ‘conversion therapy’ as a legitimate medical
District of Columbia, and a number of localities have banned health care
professionals from using conversion therapy on youth.
Christy Mallory, Taylor N.T. Brown & Kerith J. Conron, Conversion Therapy and LGBT
Youth, WILLIAMS INST. 1 (June 2019) (footnotes omitted) https://williamsinstitute.
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Conversion-Therapy-Update-Jun-2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NY89-KW4D]. This Article uses the terms conversion therapy and SOCE
interchangeably.
61. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 347 (2014); see also Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust:
Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography, 102 IOWA L. REV. 709, 710 (2017) (“[Nonconsensual
pornography] can have devastating effects: Victims experience severe anxiety and depression and they are often placed in physical danger. They lose their jobs and have difficulty
finding new ones.”).
62. Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1918 (2019).
63. Id.
64. See Clay Calvert, Testing the First Amendment Validity of Laws Banning Sexual
Orientation Change Efforts on Minors: What Level of Scrutiny Applies After Becerra and
Does a Proportionality Approach Provide a Solution?, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2019) (summarizing research regarding the lack of efficacy and alleged dangers of conversion
therapy).
65. Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, APA Reiterates Strong Opposition to Conversion Therapy (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/newsroom/news-releases/apareiterates-strong-opposition-to-conversion-therapy [https://perma.cc/PYP4-3ZA6].
66. Id.
67. AM. MED. ASS’N, LGBTQ CHANGE EFFORTS (SO-CALLED “CONVERSION THERAPY”) 2 (2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2019-12/conversion-therapy-issuebrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7XF-6ZP6].
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treatment.”68
Part II of this Article initially reviews the concept of low-value speech
and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
which suggested in dictum that such expression falls completely outside
the wall of First Amendment protection.69 It also describes how United
States v. Stevens, as addressed earlier,70 revamped the calculus for identifying categories of speech that are unsheltered by the First Amendment.
Part III then provides a brief primer on two well-established justifications
for protecting free expression—namely, fostering informed, democratic
self-governance and discovering (or, at least, testing notions of) the truth
in the marketplace of ideas. Additionally, it suggests how—generally
speaking—speech in the form of nonconsensual pornography and SOCE
do not advance these values.
Next, Part IV delves deeper into the Supreme Court of Illinois’s avoidance of strict scrutiny in Austin and exposes multiple flaws with that
court’s analysis. Part IV also reveals how two courts in 2019 deployed
tests less rigorous than strict scrutiny when examining laws barring SOCE
on minors. Part V then argues that courts addressing the question of scrutiny in these matters are better off embracing Justice Breyer’s preferred
scrutiny analysis of proportionality rather than inventing other, highly
suspect workarounds for Reed. The level of scrutiny, under Justice
Breyer’s approach, fluctuates based on an evaluation of whether protecting the speech in question would further traditional First Amendment
values and objectives, including those addressed in Part III of this Article.
Finally, Part VI concludes that, in light of the issues raised by the lowvalue speech of nonconsensual pornography and SOCE, the U.S. Supreme Court should revisit both Reed and Stevens in order to facilitate
the analysis of such expression under Justice Breyer’s methodology.
II. LOW-VALUE SPEECH AND EXCLUSIONS FROM FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION: FROM CHAPLINSKY TO
STEVENS
Despite its unequivocal “no law” terminology that seemingly affords
absolute protection to speech from government censorship—“Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”71—the U.S. Supreme Court never has interpreted that language literally.72 As one re68. Id. at 3.
69. 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
70. See supra notes 36–47 (addressing Stevens and how scholars have interpreted it).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
72. See Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1731 (2007) (“The
First Amendment may say that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech, but of course it doesn’t really mean that. Whole categories of expression are carved
out of protectable speech.” (footnote omitted)); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of
Rights: The Rhetoric and Practice of Rights in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 292 (2010)
(“[T]he First Amendment does not protect all forms of expression, although one would
never guess it from the rhetoric. The Court has excluded some categories of speech from
First Amendment protection altogether . . . .”).
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cent article sums it up, “American jurisprudence has rejected an
absolutist interpretation of the Amendment.”73 Justice Holmes famously
suggested this more than a century ago, writing that “[t]he most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire
in a theatre and causing a panic.”74 The Supreme Court today, in fact, has
held that multiple varieties of speech generally receive no First Amendment protection.75
A momentous Supreme Court ruling affecting when speech falls
outside the First Amendment’s coverage is Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.76 The Court there identified for the first time so-called fighting
words as a category of speech that could be punished without raising First
Amendment problems.77 The case, however, did much more than that.
As Professor Ronald Turner comments, Chaplinsky deployed a methodology “of extreme categorization, with the Court indicating that certain
types of expression, such as fighting words, the lewd and obscene, the
profane, and the libelous, are wholly outside the coverage and protection
of the First Amendment.”78
The Chaplinsky Court embraced this “categorical approach to setting
the First Amendment’s boundaries”79 by engaging in what today is
dubbed “famous dictum.”80 Specifically, Justice Murphy wrote for a
73. Louis W. Tompros, Richard A. Crudo, Alexis Pfeiffer & Rahel Boghossian, The
Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech Made on Social Networking Sites in a PostAlvarez, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 87 (2017). A person
who embraces an absolutist view of the First Amendment “would treat freedom of speech
as an utterly impregnable right.” RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY
23 (1992).
74. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Holmes’s “theater analogy is the
most enduring analogy in the constitutional canon” and is “shorthand for why rights are
not unlimited.” Carlton F.W. Larson, “Shouting ‘Fire’ in a Theater”: The Life and Times of
Constitutional Law’s Most Enduring Analogy, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 181, 184
(2015). It represents “a perfect retort to the frivolous argument that all speech, regardless
of context or consequences, is immunized from governmental regulation.” Id. at 183.
75. See supra note 38 (identifying categories of expression that the Court had held
generally are not safeguarded by the First Amendment).
76. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
77. See id. at 571–72 (holding that fighting words are among the “certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem” and defining fighting words as
“those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace”); see also Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1527 (1993) (“Chaplinsky has generally been read as placing fighting words
outside the coverage of the First Amendment on a per se basis. According to this approach, there is a category of ‘fighting words’ that, because of their content, do not constitute speech at all.” (footnote omitted)).
78. Ronald Turner, Hate Speech and the First Amendment: The Supreme Court’s
R.A.V. Decision, 61 TENN. L. REV. 197, 205 (1993); see Burton Caine, The Trouble With
“Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire is a Threat to First Amendment Values
and Should Be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 456 (2004) (“Chaplinsky invented the
theory that entire categories of speech are denied First Amendment protection.”).
79. Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1343 (2015).
80. Wayne Batchis, On the Categorical Approach to Free Speech–And the Protracted
Failure to Delimit the True Threats Exception to the First Amendment, 37 PACE L. REV. 1,
11 (2016).
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unanimous Court that the above-noted brands of expression serve “no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”81 Dean
Rodney Smolla identifies Justice Murphy’s logic as part “of the single
most powerful and oft-cited passages in all of American free speech
law.”82 That largely is because this dictum, as Professor Jeffrey Shaman
asserts, marked the beginning of the low-value theory of free
expression.83
Professor Ronald Collins explains that this approach to First Amendment law pivots “on the value of the expression in question,” whereby if
it fails to serve “normative values” such as elucidating ideas or furthering
the quest for truth, “then it could easily be added to any list of unprotected speech.”84 In other words, categorizing speech as low value under
Chaplinsky renders it “removed from the ordinary suite of First Amendment protections.”85 In making this determination, “judges identified unprotected categories of speech by their inclusion or exclusion from core
free speech values of self-expression, political participation, or informative content.”86
Nearly seventy years after Chaplinsky, however, the Court severely
modified, if not completely abandoned, this approach in United States v.
Stevens.87 The Stevens Court explained that “[w]hen we have identified
categories of speech as fully outside the protection of the First Amendment, it has not been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis”88 that
entails “an ad hoc balancing of [the] relative social costs and benefits”89
of protecting the speech. There must be something in addition to the con81. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
82. Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Era of Terrorism: Words “Which by Their
Very Utterance Inflict Injury”: The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in
Free Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 318 (2009).
83. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297,
301 (1995) (“The low-value speech theory traces its genesis to a bit of Supreme Court
dictum in the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.”); see also Joseph Russomanno,
Facebook Threats: The Missed Opportunities of Elonis v. United States, 21 COMMC’N L. &
POL’Y 1, 26 (2016) (asserting that the “doctrine of low-value-speech . . . be[gan] with the
Court’s 1942 ruling in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire”).
84. Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword, Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the
First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 422 (2012).
85. Kyle Langvardt, A Model of First Amendment Decision-Making at a Divided
Court, 84 TENN. L. REV. 833, 839 (2017).
86. Alexander Tsesis, Categorizing Student Speech, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1166
(2018); see also Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 394 (2009) (describing Chaplinsky as involving a
balancing methodology that “is informed by First Amendment values” and that produces
“a categorical result” by excluding some forms of speech from First Amendment
coverage).
87. 559 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2010); see MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON,
LYRISSA C. BARNETT LIDSKY & AMY GAJDA, MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 109
(9th ed. 2016) (asserting that the Court in Stevens seemed to reject “the premise articulated
by Chaplinsky”).
88. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.
89. Id. at 470.
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sideration of the value of the speech.90 As described earlier, that additional something is a long history of the speech being considered
unprotected in the United States, even if the Supreme Court has not directly considered whether the First Amendment shelters it.91 For example, the Court in Stevens pointed out that when it held in 1982 that child
pornography was not protected by the First Amendment, it “grounded its
analysis in a previously recognized, long-established category of unprotected speech.”92 The Court in Stevens rejected the government’s view
“that categories of speech may be exempted from the First Amendment’s
protection without any long-settled tradition of subjecting that speech to
regulation.”93 Putting this in slightly different terms one year later in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Court stressed that there
must be “a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription” of
the speech for it to fall outside the ambit of First Amendment coverage.94
This test makes it extraordinarily difficult to declare that nonconsensual pornography and speech-based conversion therapy on minors is unprotected by the First Amendment. That is because the regulation of such
speech is relatively new. Regarding the former brand of expression, Professor Mary Anne Franks notes that “[b]efore 2003, no law in the United
States explicitly criminalized the unauthorized disclosure of sexually explicit images of another adult person.”95 In fact, she adds that
before 2013 there were few laws in the United States explicitly addressing this invasion of sexual privacy, even as concerns over almost
every other form of privacy (financial, medical, data) have captured
legal and social imagination. While some existing voyeurism, surveillance, and computer hacking laws may prohibit the nonconsensual
observation and recording of individuals in states of undress or engaged in sexual activity, the nonconsensual disclosure of intimate
images has been, until very recently, largely unregulated by the
law.96
90. See id. at 471 (describing the Court’s recognition in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747 (1982), of child pornography as an unprotected category of speech, and remarking that
its Ferber “decision did not rest on this ‘balance of competing interests’ alone” (emphasis
added) (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764)).
91. See supra notes 36–47 (addressing Stevens and how it has been interpreted by
some scholars). This is not to say, however, that the Court in Chaplinsky found a history of
non-protection totally irrelevant. The use of the word “never” in the following statement
from Chaplinsky intimates that history is, in fact, a consideration: “There are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). Professor Mark Tushnet explains that this language
represents a “historical” theme in the Chaplinsky analysis. Mark Tushnet, The Coverage/
Protection Distinction in the Law of Freedom of Speech—An Essay on Meta-Doctrine in
Constitutional Law, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1073, 1078 (2017).
92. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.
93. Id. at 469.
94. Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011).
95. Franks, supra note 37, at 1255.
96. Id. at 1261.
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A similar recency-of-prohibition predicament holds true for statutes
targeting speech-based conversion therapy or SOCE on minors. Professor
Melissa Ballengee Alexander remarks that in 2012, “California made national headlines as the first state to ban state-licensed mental health providers from engaging minors in conversion therapy. New Jersey followed
suit a year later, and the District of Columbia the year after that.”97 And
while by late 2019 eighteen states and dozens of local municipalities had
laws restricting conversion therapy in some way, a few of those measures
still permit the practice on minors if done within the context of religious
counseling.98
In a nutshell, there is only an extremely brief history of laws in the
United States regulating or banning both nonconsensual pornography
and conversion therapy. This, in turn, strongly signals that under the approach for identifying new varieties of unprotected speech embraced in
Stevens, neither nonconsensual pornography nor speech-based conversion therapy on minors would go without at least some modicum of First
Amendment shelter from government censorship were the Supreme
Court to face that issue. In other words, despite the apparently toxic nature of both nonconsensual pornography and conversion therapy that
might have rendered them outside the ambit of First Amendment protection under Chaplinsky’s low-value approach, they seemingly are covered
as protected forms of expression under Stevens.99 This comports with Professor Andrew Koppelman’s observation that, under Stevens, the Court
“will craft no new exceptions to free speech protection.”100
The next Part addresses two traditional rationales for protecting expression under the First Amendment—truth discovery in the public marketplace of ideas and the promotion of democratic self-governance.
These rationales are examined both to reveal that neither nonconsensual
pornography nor SOCE furthers these interests in any significant way—
in other words, they are truly low-value brands of speech under the
Chaplinsky approach—and to set the stage for Part V’s call for applying
Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach to scrutiny that readily accounts for such First Amendment interests.

97. Melissa Ballengee Alexander, Autonomy and Accountability: Why Informed Consent, Consumer Protection, and Defunding May Beat Conversion Therapy Bans, 55 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 283, 289 (2017) (footnote omitted); see Alena Allen, Dense Women, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 847, 890 (2015) (“[I]n 2012, California became the first state in the nation to
prohibit licensed psychotherapists from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts, such
as conversion therapy, for patients under eighteen years of age. In 2013, New Jersey passed
a similar statute.” (footnote omitted)).
98. Tiffany C. Graham, Conversion Therapy: A Brief Reflection on the History of the
Practice and Contemporary Regulatory Efforts, 52 CREIGHTON L. REV. 419, 423–25 (2019).
99. See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text (addressing the low-value, harmful
nature of both nonconsensual pornography and conversion therapy on minors).
100. Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty
Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1145 (2016) (emphasis added).
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III. A POWERFUL PAIR OF FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH
INTERESTS: DISCOVERING AND TESTING THE
TRUTH AND PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC
SELF-GOVERNANCE
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court reasoned that
punishing and preventing speech such as fighting words and obscenity has
“never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem” because, in key
part, such messages “are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.”101 The emphasized portion of that
quotation taps directly into the First Amendment principle that a diverse,
wide-open marketplace of ideas should be privileged in order to facilitate
a search for truth. As Justice Holmes wrote in his 1919 dissent in Abrams
v. United States:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.102
With this “elegant defense,”103 Justice Holmes ushered into First
Amendment law the marketplace of ideas theory of free speech.104 More
than 100 years later, the Justice’s “paean to truth and free speech”105 has
“assumed the status of seminal secular scripture, becoming to First
Amendment law what Genesis is to the Bible.”106 Under this theory, as
Professor Frederick Schauer synthesized it, “truth will most likely surface
when all opinions may freely be expressed, [and] when there is an open
and unregulated market for the trade in ideas” in which opinions are
tested.107 Accepted truths, in turn, must be constantly tested, given that
they often turn out to be wrong in the long run.108 In other words, the
101. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added).
102. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
103. Rodney A. Smolla, Content and Context: The Contributions of William Van Alstyne to First Amendment Interpretation, 54 DUKE L.J. 1623, 1637 (2005).
104. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1,
2–3 (1984). The theory predates Holmes, of course, with John Milton contending in the
1600s that governments, rather than engaging in censorship and licensing the press in order
to protect the truth, should “[l]et [Truth] and falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put
to the worse in a free and open encounter?” JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH
FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING 45 (H.B. Cotterill ed., Macmillan & Co. 1904)
(1644).
105. Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 133 HARV. L. REV. 439, 448
(2019).
106. Rodney A. Smolla, The Meaning of the “Marketplace of Ideas” in First Amendment
Law, 24 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 437, 437 (2019).
107. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 16 (1982).
108. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
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process of testing opinions is itself both privileged and valuable under the
marketplace theory, even if there is no objective, ultimate truth.109 Indeed, Justice Holmes “displayed an instinctive aversion to assertions of
‘absolute’ truth.”110 Additionally, the process of testing accepted truths
helps to revitalize and reinvigorate their meaning, as well as enhance how
people understand them.111
As former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post summarized it, the marketplace theory does not require protecting any and all speech that communicates ideas, but only speech that “communicates ideas and that is
embedded in the kinds of social practices that produce truth.”112 Thus,
under Chaplinsky’s approach for precluding certain varieties of expression from constitutional protection, speech that is “of such slight social
value as a step to truth”113 can more easily be jettisoned from the fortress
of First Amendment shelter, particularly when “the social interest in order and morality”114 outweighs the speech’s truth-seeking value. And
while the Stevens history-and-tradition methodology for establishing unprotected classes of speech may have rejected such a pure, ad hoc balancing approach that percolated through Chaplinsky’s dictum, the Court
nonetheless continues to favorably invoke the marketplace of ideas metaphor subsequent to Stevens.115
109. SMOLLA, supra note 73, at 8; see Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative Channels” Flaw in First Amendment Doctrine, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657, 1696, 1698 (2016)
(noting that “[m]arketplace theory defines the First Amendment’s primary function as facilitating a process by which truth can be reached,” and adding that “[a] process-based
definition of marketplace theory predominates in First Amendment scholarship” (emphasis
added)).
110. Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14.
111. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 116 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1974) (1859) (contending that “unless [a received opinion] is suffered to be, and
actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be
held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational
grounds”). Mill often is associated with the marketplace of ideas theory. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE
CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 3 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillmann eds., 2001)
(“Marketplace theory grew in sophistication as a result of British philosopher John Stuart
Mill’s 1859 defense of free speech in ‘On Liberty.’”).
112. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 164 (Lee C. Bollinger
& Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (emphasis added).
113. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374–75
(2018) (referencing the marketplace of ideas and citing favorably Justice Holmes’s assertion in Abrams that “[t]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (asserting that the viewpoint-based nature of the statute at issue in the case
“might silence dissent and distort the marketplace of ideas”); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576
U.S. 155, 176–77 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]henever government disfavors one
kind of speech, it places that speech at a disadvantage, potentially interfering with the free
marketplace of ideas . . . .”); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (“[T]he Court has stated ‘[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas . . . .’”
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Interestingly, Austin actually may be the exceedingly rare case in which
the nonconsensual dissemination of sexual imagery was directly intended
to serve a truth-proving purpose, albeit on a very small scale. In particular, while defendant Bethany Austin was engaged to be married, a female
neighbor—identified in the case as the victim—texted nude photographs
of herself to Austin’s fiancé, Matthew.116 Bethany Austin discovered the
images because she and Matthew shared an iCloud account.117 Bethany
Austin and Matthew then cancelled their wedding and broke up.118 Matthew proceeded to blame Bethany for the breakup, “telling family and
friends that their relationship had ended because defendant [Bethany
Austin] was crazy and no longer cooked or did household chores.”119 Engaging in what First Amendment scholars might consider a classic instance of the self-help remedy of counterspeech in order to prove what
really transpired in their relationship,120 Bethany Austin “wrote a letter
detailing her version of events. As support, she attached to the letter four
of the naked pictures of the victim and copies of the text messages between the victim and Matthew.”121 As Bethany Austin’s attorneys put it
in their unsuccessful petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court, she disseminated the photos “to contradict her fiancé’s false account of why their engagement ended”122 and to “reveal[ ] the true reason for the breakup.”123 In other words, Bethany Austin used the images
to expose the truth. After Matthew discovered her actions from his
cousin, however, he contacted the police and Bethany Austin was subsequently prosecuted under Illinois’s revenge pornography statute.124
Of course, the analogy in Austin to the marketplace metaphor is somewhat strained. First, the marketplace within which the nude photos circulated was a miniscule one involving only those to whom Bethany Austin
(second and third alteration in original) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 52 (1988))).
116. People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶¶ 3–4, petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1029 (U.S.
Feb. 14, 2020).
117. Id.
118. Id. ¶ 5.
119. Id.
120. Justice Brandeis famously articulated the counterspeech doctrine more than ninety
years ago, asserting that “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); see also Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1519, 1526 (2019) (“The remedy for harmful ideas in this marketplace [of
ideas] is not censorship but counterspeech, which works by allowing those who are exposed
to bad speech to be exposed to good speech as a counterweight.”); Howard M. Wasserman,
Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 387 (2004) (referencing “the
Brandeisian concept of counter-speech” under which “counter-speech is the imperative
response to any thought, opinion, idea, or point of view”).
121. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 6.
122. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Austin, 2019 IL 123910, (No. 19-1029) (U.S.
Feb. 14, 2020). Due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. Supreme Court
denied the petition more than seven months after it was filed. Austin v. Illinois, No. 191029, 2020 WL 5882221 (Oct. 5, 2020).
123. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 122, at 10.
124. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶¶ 7–8.
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sent the images. Second, the images themselves were irrefutable facts, not
the kind of debatable ideas, opinions, or thoughts that underlie the marketplace of ideas theory.125 In brief, the photographs at issue in Austin
may have exposed the truth about a particular individual’s reason for
breaking up with someone else, but there was no larger, societal-level
search for truth served by their dissemination.
In addition to referencing the truth-seeking value of speech, the Court
in Chaplinsky reasoned that messages that serve “no essential part of any
exposition of ideas” may also fall outside the scope of First Amendment
protection.126 Professor James Weinstein asserts that this largely represents “an attempt to draw a line between public discourse and other types
of speech . . . that have little or no connection with democratic self-governance.”127 To the extent that the “exposition of ideas” the Chaplinsky
Court privileges and protects are, indeed, political ones that facilitate
democratic self-governance, another paramount First Amendment value
comes into play when deciding if speech merits constitutional
coverage.128
The free speech theory of democratic self-governance is rooted in the
principle that free expression is required for the government and democracy to function properly.129 The theory holds that “the essential objective of the First Amendment is to promote a rich and valuable public
debate.”130 A core facet of the theory is that it rests upon the “enlightenment of society and its elected representatives.”131
The democratic self-governance theory often is associated with Alexander Meiklejohn.132 He asserted that “[s]elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and
generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot
is assumed to express.”133 More specifically, Meiklejohn averred that the
dual points of ultimate interest in safeguarding political speech are “the
125. See generally Clay Calvert, Stephanie McNeff, Austin Vining & Sebastian Zarate,
Fake News and the First Amendment: Reconciling a Disconnect Between Theory and Doctrine, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 99, 125–28 (2018) (addressing how the marketplace of ideas focuses on the value of protecting competition among opinions and ideas).
126. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
127. James Weinstein, Database Protection and the First Amendment, 28 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 305, 317 n.69 (2002).
128. See Han, supra note 4, at 364 (asserting that protecting speech because it “is a
necessary component of democratic self-governance” ranks among the leading “rationales
[that] have generally dominated debates regarding First Amendment theory”).
129. See Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and Reform of the
Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1109 (1993).
130. Id.
131. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 28 (1971).
132. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the First
Amendment: Disentangling Culture, Community, and Freedom of Expression, 1998 WIS. L.
REV. 905, 916 (“Alexander Meiklejohn forcefully articulated the primary alternative account of the First Amendment. In his view, the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment exists principally to facilitate democratic self-governance.” (footnote omitted)).
133. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 255.
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minds of the hearers”134 and “the voting of wise decisions.”135
Meiklejohn’s view, as summed up by Professor Joseph Russomanno, is
that “[t]he Constitution’s commitment to freedom of speech is a commitment to the concept of self-government.”136
The theory is deeply engrained in First Amendment jurisprudence. As
Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat notes, “the Supreme Court has repeatedly
taken the position that the primary—albeit not necessarily the only—reason why the First Amendment protects freedom of speech is to advance
democratic self-governance.”137 As described immediately below, the
Court has tapped into the theory on multiple occasions.
For example, the Court has emphasized “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open”138 and that “[s]peech by citizens on matters of
public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment.”139 Additionally,
the Justices have explained that “[t]he protection given speech and press
was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.”140 Furthermore, as Justice Kennedy reasoned for the majority a decade ago, “political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by
design or inadvertence.”141 He added, as if channeling his inner
Meiklejohn, that “[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and
to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened
self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”142
It is hard to fathom how either the nonconsensual dissemination of sexual images or the speech-based practice of conversion therapy on minors
serves societal-level goals of truth discovery in the marketplace of ideas
(Austin, as noted above, perhaps being a rare exception for revenge pornography and, even then, within a miniature marketplace of ideas) or
promotes democratic self-governance.143 In fact, as addressed earlier,
134. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN25 (1948).
135. Id.
136. Joseph Russomanno, The “Central Meaning” and Path Dependence: The MadisonMeiklejohn-Brennan Nexus, 20 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 117, 129–130 (2015).
137. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097,
1098 (2016).
138. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
139. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 235 (2014).
140. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”).
141. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
142. Id. at 339.
143. Whether or not it is true, as it were, that conversion therapy harms minors is a
different issue from the one here of whether conversion helps society discover some larger
truth in the marketplace of ideas. Cf. Clay Calvert, Kara Carnley, Brittany Link & Linda
Riedemann, Conversion Therapy and Free Speech: A Doctrinal and Theoretical First
Amendment Analysis, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 525, 562 (2014) (querying whether
it is “the truth that SOCE not only do not work, but also cause harm to minors? What is
the truth about SOCE?”).
MENT
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both forms of speech may be quite harmful to individuals.144
There are, of course, other theories and rationales for protecting free
expression beyond seeking or testing truth in the marketplace of ideas
and facilitating democratic self-governance.145 The two identified here,
however, both relate, as explained above, to Chaplinsky’s logic regarding
when speech may be precluded from First Amendment protection—
namely, when its value in serving truth and elucidating ideas that assist
democratic self-governance are de minimis in comparison to the harm
they wreak to society’s interests in order and morality.146 The Article returns to the marketplace of ideas theory in Part IV’s discussion of the
federal district court’s 2019 ruling in the conversion therapy case of Otto
v. City of Boca Raton.147 Additionally, the Article circles back to the First
Amendment interests in both truth-seeking and democratic self-governance in Part V when addressing Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach
to scrutiny.
IV. CHARTING COURSES AROUND STRICT SCRUTINY
WHEN CONFRONTED WITH CONTENT-BASED LAWS:
SOME LESSONS FROM AUSTIN AND
RECENT ANTI-SOCE LAW
LITIGATION
This Part examines how some courts, despite Reed’s admonition that
facially content-based statutes generally must overcome strict scrutiny,
are finding methods to circumvent that mandate and apply a less stringent level of analysis. Initially, Section A delves more deeply into the
Supreme Court of Illinois’s efforts to sidestep strict scrutiny when confronted with a law targeting the low-value speech of nonconsensual pornography in People v. Austin.148 Section B then addresses a federal
district court’s decision in September 2019 in Doyle v. Hogan149 to apply
intermediate scrutiny when faced with a free speech claim targeting a Maryland statute banning conversion therapy on minors.150 After examining
Doyle, Section B then turns to U.S. District Judge Rosenberg’s decision
in Otto v. City of Boca Raton151 in February 2019 considering a free
speech challenge to two local ordinances banning conversion therapy on
144. See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text (addressing the harms purportedly
caused by these two varieties of speech).
145. See generally Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878–79 (1963) (identifying other rationales for protecting free
speech, including “assuring individual self-fulfillment” and “maintaining the balance between stability and change in the society”).
146. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
147. 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-10604 (11th Cir.
Feb. 14, 2019).
148. 2019 IL 123910, petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1029 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2020).
149. 411 F. Supp. 3d 337, 348 (D. Md. 2019).
150. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 1-212.1(b) (LexisNexis 2020) (“A mental
health or child care practitioner may not engage in conversion therapy with an individual
who is a minor.”).
151. 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1270.
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minors.152 Judge Rosenberg found that intermediate scrutiny was most
likely the correct standard of review to apply to such measures,153 although she ultimately noted that it was unclear what test should be
used.154
A.

PEOPLE V. AUSTIN

As described in the Introduction, in Austin, the Supreme Court of Illinois readily admitted that the nonconsensual pornography statute under
consideration was facially content based, yet it nonetheless applied intermediate scrutiny to measure its validity and to uphold it in the face of
First Amendment speech concerns.155 How it reached that scrutiny determination—how it finagled its way around Reed’s reach—is the focus of
this Section.
Before analyzing how the Supreme Court of Illinois sidestepped Reed
and strict scrutiny, however, it is essential to examine key provisions of
the statute at issue in Austin. In particular, the law provides that:
A person commits non-consensual dissemination of private sexual
images when he or she:
(1) intentionally disseminates an image of another person:
(A) who is at least 18 years of age; and
(B) who is identifiable from the image itself or information displayed in connection with the image; and
(C) who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are
exposed, in whole or in part; and
(2) obtains the image under circumstances in which a reasonable
person would know or understand that the image was to remain
private; and
(3) knows or should have known that the person in the image has
not consented to the dissemination.156
152. See BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-106 (2020) (“It shall be unlawful for any provider to practice conversion therapy on any individual who is a minor regardless of whether the provider receives monetary compensation in exchange for such
services.”); PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-125 (2020) (“It shall
be unlawful for any Provider to engage in conversion therapy on any minor regardless of
whether the Provider receives monetary compensation in exchange for such services.”).
153. See Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1256 (“[A]pplying intermediate scrutiny to medical
treatments that are effectuated through speech would strike the appropriate balance between recognizing that doctors maintain some freedom of speech within their offices, and
acknowledging that treatments may be subject to significant regulation under the government’s police powers.”).
154. See id. at 1258 (“The Court concludes that it is unclear what standard of review
should apply to this case. It seems likely that the ordinances are subject to more than
rational basis review, but beyond that determination, it is unclear whether intermediate or
strict scrutiny should apply.”).
155. 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 43, petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1029 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2020) (“We
conclude that section 11-23.5(b) is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny for two independent reasons. First, the statute is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.
Second, the statute regulates a purely private matter.”); id. ¶ 46 (“We recognize that section 11-23.5(b) on its face targets the dissemination of a specific category of speech—sexual images.”).
156. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5(b) (2020).
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Unpacking this language, there are two distinct sets of terms: (1) terms
that focus on the content involved—namely, images in which a person is
“engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed”157 and (2)
terms that address the defendant’s understanding (knowledge or what
reasonably should be known) regarding the privacy expectations of the
individual pictured and that individual’s desire not to have the image disseminated.158 It was the Supreme Court of Illinois’s focus on the latter set
of terms—those addressing what a defendant knew or reasonably should
have known regarding the images obtained and disseminated—that partially paved the path for it to decide that the law was a content-neutral
time, place, and manner regulation.159 That is because, at least in the
court’s view and as described immediately below, it is “[t]he manner of
the image’s acquisition and publication” by the defendant that determines criminal liability.160 In other words, there is no criminal culpability
under the statute for a defendant who disseminates the exact same content if the defendant either would not have reasonably known that the
person depicted expected the image to remain private or if the defendant
did not know or should not have known that individual did not want it to
be disseminated.161
The five-justice majority of Illinois’s highest appellate court ultimately
offered two independent reasons for applying intermediate scrutiny.162
Those grounds are addressed separately in the subsections below.
1. Interpreting the Statute as a Content-Neutral Time, Place, and
Manner Regulation
The Illinois Supreme Court first held the statute was subject to intermediate scrutiny because it deemed the law content neutral. The court
reached this conclusion by reasoning that the statute’s underlying purpose is to protect privacy—not to censor speech—and that, when it
comes to serving the government’s interest in privacy, criminal liability
(as noted above) hinges squarely on the manner in which a sexual image
is both obtained and disseminated, not on the content itself.163 As such, it
157. Id. § 11-23.5(b)(1)(C).
158. Id. § 11-23.5(b)(2)–(3).
159. See generally Judith Welch Wegner & Matthew Norchi, Regulating Panhandling:
Reed and Beyond, 63 S.D. L. REV. 579, 596 (2019) (describing how content-neutral content, place, and manner regulations affecting speech in public forums typically are subject
to “an intermediate level of review” rather than the “strict scrutiny [standard that is] applicable to content-based speech” regulations); Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests, 104
IOWA L. REV. 223, 231 (2018) (observing that in both traditional and designated public
forums, “the government can impose content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of expression so long as those restrictions suppress no more speech than is necessary to serve its significant interests”).
160. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 49.
161. See id. (“There is no criminal liability for the dissemination of the very same image
obtained and distributed with consent. The manner of the image’s acquisition and publication, and not its content, is thus crucial to the illegality of its dissemination.”).
162. Id. ¶ 43.
163. Id. ¶ 49.

2020]

Escaping Doctrinal Lockboxes

751

found the law “[was] a content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction.”164
To support this line of logic, the court made multiple maneuvers. Initially, it relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s pre-Reed decision in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism165 for the proposition that the government’s rationale or reason for adopting a statute dictates whether it is content neutral
or content based.166 In particular, the Court in Ward held that “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral,
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others.”167 The Ward Court added that justifying a law with a reason that
is unrelated to legislative disagreement with the content in question renders the law content neutral.168
Conspicuous in its absence from the Supreme Court of Illinois’s opinion in Austin, however, is any mention whatsoever of the superseding
admonition in Reed that “[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’
in the regulated speech.”169 Reinforcing this principle in even simpler and
starker terms, Justice Thomas added for the Reed majority that “an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into
one that is content neutral.”170 Yet these key aspects of Reed simply went
missing, as it were, in Austin.
With Reed ignored—or, put more charitably, overlooked—Ward thus
ostensibly gave the greenlight to the Supreme Court of Illinois to focus
on the purpose of Illinois’s nonconsensual pornography statute. The
court, in turn, had no problem concluding that the statute’s purpose was
to protect privacy, not to squelch all distribution of the sexual imagery in
question.171 In particular, the same images are freely distributable if the
depicted individual authorizes or consents to such transmission.172 In
other words, the law does not completely ban dissemination of a particular type of content; it merely regulates the manner of dissemination—in
particular, nonconsensual dissemination—in the name of privacy.173 That,
at least, is the heart of the logic of the Supreme Court of Illinois in
Austin.
164. Id. ¶ 43.
165. 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989).
166. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 46.
167. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
168. Id.
169. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165 (2015) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)).
170. Id. at 166.
171. See Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 49 (“In the case at bar, section 11-23.5(b) is justified
on the grounds of protecting privacy.”).
172. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5(b)(3) (2020).
173. See Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 50 (“Section 11-23.5 does not prohibit but, rather,
regulates the dissemination of a certain type of private information.”).
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The court’s understanding of “manner” here, when considering content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, is itself novel and troubling. In particular, First Amendment scholars Russell Weaver and Donald
Lively note that “[a] primary example of manner governance is a noise
restriction that may protect environmental and privacy interests.”174 Indeed, the Ward case, upon which the Supreme Court of Illinois leaned
heavily, readily provides such an instance of a manner regulation. The
local ordinance at issue in Ward required musical acts and other performers at the Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell in New York City’s Central Park
“to use sound-amplification equipment and a sound technician provided
by the city.”175 This measure was adopted to control the volume of music.176 It simply allowed the government to dictate the manner through
which sound was conveyed at the bandshell—namely, via government
equipment operated by government-selected individuals. This manner-ofsound-amplification regulation was content neutral, even under Reed’s
approach to content neutrality, because it applied evenhandedly on its
face to “all performances at the bandshell”177 and had “no effect on the
quantity or content of [the] expression beyond regulating the extent of
amplification.”178
Similarly, the Court held in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence179 that a ban on sleeping in certain public parks implicated only the
manner in which a symbolic-speech protest regarding homelessness could
occur.180 This manner regulation was constitutional, in part, because it
served “a substantial Government interest in conserving park property”—an interest the Court deemed content neutral, as it was “unrelated
to suppression of expression.”181
Another example of a manner regulation is the Los Angeles municipal
ordinance that banned posting signs on public property; this regulation
174. RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 116 (2d ed. 2006); see also Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1487, 1501 (1995) (identifying “sound volume” as “the paradigm of ‘manner’ in time, place, and manner jurisprudence”).
175. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989).
176. See id. at 792 (“The principal justification for the sound-amplification guideline is
the city’s desire to control noise levels at bandshell events, in order to retain the character
of the Sheep Meadow and its more sedate activities, and to avoid undue intrusion into
residential areas and other areas of the park.”). New York City rejected a fixed-decibel
measure to serve this same interest “because the impact on listeners of a single decibel
level is not constant, but varies in response to changes in air temperature, foliage, audience
size, and like factors.” Id. at 786.
177. Id. at 787.
178. Id. at 802.
179. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
180. Id. at 294. The Court explained in Clark:
If the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the National
Parks are adequately protected . . . and if the parks would be more exposed
to harm without the sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from
invalidation under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of the
manner in which a demonstration may be carried out.
Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 299.
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was declared constitutional by the Court in Members of City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent.182 Adopted to serve Los Angeles’s esthetic interest “in eliminating visual clutter,”183 the ordinance simply regulated one
“tangible medium of expressing [a] message.”184 Other methods for conveying messages on public property, such as speaking to individuals or
handing them literature, were not restricted.185 In other words, only the
medium through which speech could permissibly occur was affected by
the ordinance.
Under this conception of manner, a law that bans leafleting in a particular location but not other methods of communicating in that same
venue, is also a manner regulation.186 Similarly, a manner regulation exists when a law “bars sound trucks from broadcasting in a loud and raucous manner on the streets” but does not impede speech on those same
streets when conveyed “by the human voice, by newspapers, by pamphlets, [or] by dodgers.”187
In brief, the manner regulations in cases such as Ward, Clark, and Taxpayers for Vincent target the physical methods or mediums through which
speech is conveyed.188 In Ward, the permissible method for conveying
bandshell sound was by government-controlled and government-operated equipment. In Clark, the banned method for protesting homelessness in a park was sleeping, while in Taxpayers for Vincent the barred
medium for communicating ideas was signs.
The Supreme Court of Illinois’s interpretation of a “manner” restriction in Austin, however, is far afield from the understanding of manner as
a method, vehicle, or medium for transmitting messages. The Illinois
court’s interpretation of manner instead relates to what a disseminator of
a sexual image knew or should have known about the wants and desires
of the person depicted in that image regarding his or her privacy expectations and consent to its distribution.189 In Austin, the manner of obtaining
182. 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984).
183. Id. at 808.
184. Id. at 810.
185. See id. at 812 (“The Los Angeles ordinance does not affect any individual’s freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the
posting of signs on public property is prohibited.”).
186. See Zanna v. Mohave County, No. CV-10-8149-PCT-GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
126602, at *15 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2012) (“In short, the County restricted a particular manner
of speech at the meeting—namely leafleting—but did not target Plaintiffs’ particular viewpoint. A manner regulation, without more, does not constitute viewpoint discrimination.”).
187. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).
188. Cf. Alan Howard, The Mode in the Middle: Recognizing a New Category of Speech
Regulations for Modes of Expression, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 47, 58 (2007) (“Generally,
cases regarding a ‘time, place and manner restriction’ involve government regulation of the
methods by which speakers distribute their speech to others . . . .”).
189. The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned here that the statute at issue
distinguishes the dissemination of a sexual image not based on the content of
the image itself but, rather, based on whether the disseminator obtained the
image under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know that
the image was to remain private and knows or should have known that the
person in the image has not consented to the dissemination. There is no criminal liability for the dissemination of the very same image obtained and dis-
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an image therefore had nothing to do with whether the image was received by a method or medium such as hand delivery, in hardcopy form
(an old-school Polaroid photo, for instance), or by an electronic method
(such as texting in a digital format). Manner, in the Supreme Court of
Illinois’s view, instead focuses on what a defendant’s state of mind should
have been upon receiving an image—should the defendant have known
or understood it “was to remain private”?190—and whether the defendant
knew “or should have known that the person in the image ha[d] not consented to the dissemination”191 by the defendant. Manner, in short, is a
matter of a defendant’s understanding (or what the defendant’s understanding reasonably should have been) about the depicted person’s privacy and dissemination expectations.
The only support that the Supreme Court of Illinois in Austin could
muster for this odd understanding of a manner restriction was to cite
parts of two sentences from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.192 Specifically, the Supreme
Court of Illinois wrote that the Court in Turner “acknowledge[ed] that
the statutory ‘provisions [at issue in Turner] distinguish between speakers
in the television programming market. But they do so based only upon
the manner in which speakers transmit their messages to viewers, and not
upon the messages they carry.’”193
This analogy to Turner, however, is decidedly dubious. That is because
the manner distinction to which the U.S. Supreme Court referred had
nothing to do with a defendant’s state of mind about another person’s
privacy expectations regarding an image. Instead, Turner involved a classic manner distinction: one based upon physical differences in the nature
of the mediums for transmitting speech. In particular, Turner hinged on
the division between whether speech was transmitted by broadcast-medium stations, on the one hand, or by cable-medium channels or cable
system operators, on the other. As the Turner Court explained regarding
the obligations imposed by the must-carry statute at issue there, “Broadcasters, which transmit over the airwaves, are favored, while cable programmers, which do not, are disfavored. Cable operators, too, are
burdened by the carriage obligations, but only because they control access to the cable conduit.”194 In other words, it was the physical manner
of transmitting speech—by broadcast or by cable—that was pivotal in
Turner.
tributed with consent. The manner of the image’s acquisition and publication,
and not its content, is thus crucial to the illegality of its dissemination.
People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 49 (citation omitted), petition for cert. filed, No. 191029 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2020).
190. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-23.5(b)(2) (2020).
191. Id. § 11-23.5(b)(3).
192. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
193. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 49 (emphasis added) (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 645).
194. Turner, 512 U.S. at 645. The must-carry statute at issue in Turner “require[d] cable
television systems to devote a portion of their channels to the transmission of local broadcast television stations.” Id. at 626.
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The Supreme Court of Illinois’s second maneuver to escape Reed was
to turn to another older U.S. Supreme Court ruling—namely, its 1986
decision in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.195 The Court in Renton held that a municipal zoning ordinance targeting the location of adult
movie theaters was content neutral and therefore subject to intermediate
scrutiny because the government’s primary justification for the measure—ameliorating the negative “secondary effects of such theaters on
the surrounding community,”196 such as an increase in crime and a decrease in property values197—was not aimed at the content of the movies
themselves.198 The secondary effects doctrine that animates Renton provides a mechanism for turning what seemingly are content-based laws
into content-neutral ones and, in turn, subjecting them to intermediate
analysis rather than strict scrutiny.199 As Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs
encapsulates it, “The determination that a regulation is aimed at reducing
the negative secondary effects of erotic entertainment is crucial to moving
a facially content-based regulation out of strict scrutiny.”200
To the extent that the secondary effects doctrine might survive Reed v.
Town of Gilbert201 and, in turn, might be broadly interpreted, as one
scholar recently alleged, to have “subsumed traditional strict scrutiny
195. 475 U.S. 41 (1986); see Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 47 (calling Renton “instructive”).
196. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
197. Id. at 48; see City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002)
(“[T]he Renton ordinance was aimed not at the content of the films shown at adult theaters, but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community,
namely, at crime rates, property values, and the quality of the city’s neighborhoods.”).
198. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (“In short, the Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our definition of ‘content-neutral’ speech regulations as those that ‘are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976))); see also Ned
Snow, Denying Trademark for Scandalous Speech, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2331, 2359
(2018) (noting that in Renton, “because the ordinance targeted secondary effects of the
content, rather than the content itself, the Court held that the restriction should be treated
as though it were content neutral”).
199. Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Stripping Away First Amendment Rights: The
Legislative Assault on Sexually Oriented Businesses, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 287,
295–96 (2004).
200. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Making Sense of Secondary Effects Analysis After Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 385, 450 (2017).
201. Whether, in fact, the secondary effects doctrine endures after Reed is unclear. The
U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in its secondary effects line of cases “raise unmistakable tensions with Reed” and, in particular, Reed’s admonition that a benign justification for an
otherwise content-based law cannot transform it into a content-neutral one. Dan T.
Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1533, 1566 (2017); see
also Hudson, Jr., supra note 15, at 276 (“Reed v. Town of Gilbert’s emphasis on contentdiscrimination . . . appears to call into question the continued validity of the secondaryeffects doctrine, a disturbing legal fiction of sorts which allows for content-based restrictions on businesses conveying ‘adult’ expression to be classified as content-neutral.”); Kyle
Langvardt, Remarks on 3D Printing, Free Speech, and Lochner, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
779, 800 (2016) (“The secondary effects idea is generally regarded as a corner-cutting measure to be applied only in cases involving marginal sexual expression such as nude dancing,
and in 2015’s Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court signaled clearly that it is no
longer good law.”).

756

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

analysis for content-based laws in the realm of sexual expression,”202 the
Supreme Court of Illinois was indeed wise to analogize to it. That is because it lowers the bar for a statute passing constitutional muster.
On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the secondary
effects doctrine only to the zoning of sexually oriented businesses and to
the regulation of the speech-based conduct—namely, nude or nearly
nude dancing203—that may go on inside them.204 In other words, deployment of the doctrine has been closely cabined and confined by the Court;
it is used only when regulating places of public accommodation that trade
in sexual content, either by zoning them or restricting what occurs within
them.205
Furthermore, the secondary effects doctrine is dubbed illegitimate by
some scholars.206 It is criticized, among other reasons, for “provid[ing]
the mechanism by which government officials receive judicial approval
for running roughshod over the First Amendment rights of those who
provide adult-oriented expression for consenting adults”207 by
“lower[ing] the level of applicable judicial scrutiny for regulations that
appear to target unfavorable expression.”208 In Austin, the Supreme
Court of Illinois essentially hijacked this disputed doctrine and took it for
a ride well beyond the regulation of sexually oriented businesses and the
activities they afford consenting adults.
202. Jason M. Shepard, The First Amendment and Mandatory Condom Laws: Rethinking the “Porn Exception” in Strict Scrutiny, Content Neutrality and Secondary Effects Analysis, 19 NEV. L.J. 85, 119 (2018).
203. The Supreme Court has held that nude dancing constitutes symbolic expression
and thus falls within the coverage of the First Amendment. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,
529 U.S. 277, 285, 289 (2000) (observing that nude dancing “is expressive conduct that is
entitled to some quantum of protection under the First Amendment,” and adding that it
“falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection”); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (concluding that nude dancing “is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so”).
204. See Daniel R. Aaronson, Gary S. Edinger & James S. Benjamin, The First Amendment in Chaos: How the Law of Secondary Effects Is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit
Courts, 63 U. MIA. L. REV. 741, 743–44 (2009) (observing that “prohibitions against nude
dancing have been upheld by some Justices on several occasions based on a perceived or
potential link to secondary effects,” and noting that those cases are Barnes and City of
Erie).
205. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 804 (noting problems spawned by
lower courts that have applied the secondary effects “beyond the arena of regulations of
sexually oriented businesses to which the Supreme Court has confined it”); see also Lisa
Crooms-Robinson, Stripped: Speech, Sex, Race, and Secondary Effects, 26 WM. & MARY J.
RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 5, 22 (2019) (noting that “[w]ith Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
and City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., the Secondary Effects Doctrine turns inward to enforce
public nudity laws inside strip clubs to ban nude dancing” and becomes “an alternate path
[for obscenity law] to reach strippers and strip clubs”).
206. See John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV . 291,
337–38 (2009) (noting that some scholars “see the doctrine as illegitimate, as it appears on
the surface to conflict with basic First Amendment principles disfavoring content
discrimination”).
207. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary-Effects Doctrine: Stripping Away First
Amendment Freedoms, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 19, 19–20 (2012).
208. Id. at 19.
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In summary, both Ward and Renton played pivotal roles for the Austin
court in reaching its conclusion that Illinois’s revenge pornography statute was a content-neutral measure subject to intermediate scrutiny. First,
Ward permitted the court to focus on legislative intent to determine
whether the law was content neutral. Second, Renton provided an example, within the realm of regulating sexual expression, where a contentneutral legislative motive—reducing the deleterious secondary effects of
sexually oriented businesses—was sufficient to transform a facially content-based law into a content-neutral one. As the next subsection illustrates, however, the Supreme Court of Illinois added a second
justification for applying intermediate scrutiny.
2. The Public vs. Private Speech Dichotomy
As noted in the Introduction, Illinois’s highest court held that the
state’s revenge pornography statute was subject to intermediate scrutiny
because the speech it regulates is of a purely private nature, rather than
of a kind that addresses a matter of public concern.209 Put bluntly, the
court created a private-speech exception or carveout from Reed’s guiding
rule that facially content-based laws undergo strict scrutiny review. As
the Supreme Court of Illinois would have it, a facially content-based law
evades strict scrutiny and instead faces only intermediate inspection if the
speech it regulates is of private—not public—concern.
From where did the court in Austin draw support for its new rule? It
cited and relied heavily upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Snyder v. Phelps210 and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders.211
Neither of those cases, however, involved judicial analysis of a statute
under a tier of review such as strict or intermediate scrutiny. Instead, Snyder was a speech-based tort case. The Court there tackled the question of
whether the First Amendment shielded members of the Westboro Baptist
Church (WBC), including its leader Reverend Fred Phelps, from liability
to plaintiff Albert Snyder under theories including intentional infliction
of emotional distress and intrusion into seclusion.212 The case arose after
WBC members hoisted signs with messages such as “Thank God for
Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” and “God Hates Fags” while standing
about 1,000 feet away from a church where a funeral was being held for
Albert Snyder’s son Matthew, a U.S. Marine killed while on duty in
209. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (addressing the Illinois Supreme
Court’s invocation of this private-versus-public dichotomy, as well as when the U.S. Supreme Court has deployed it).
210. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
211. 472 U.S. 749 (1985); see People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶¶ 53–55 (citing and
quoting both Snyder and Dun & Bradstreet), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1029 (U.S. Feb.
14, 2020).
212. See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 450 (“A jury found for Snyder on the intentional infliction
of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy claims, and held
Westboro liable for $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive
damages.”).
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Iraq.213 The WBC members held the signs to express their belief “that
God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America’s military.”214
Writing for the eight-Justice majority, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned
that “[w]hether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable
for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public
or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.”215
In other words, if WBC’s messages dealt with matters of public concern,
then tort liability would be precluded.216 The Snyder Court fashioned a
two-part test for determining whether speech is about a matter of public
concern.217 It then concluded that WBC’s signs addressed “matters of
public import,”218 such as “the political and moral conduct of the United
States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy.”219 The Court thus ruled
in WBC’s favor.220 Lower tribunals have since followed in Snyder’s footsteps, embracing a public-versus-private speech dichotomy to determine
if the First Amendment thwarts tort liability when speech allegedly
causes harm.221 Again, however, Snyder was not in any way a case in
which the Court had to either adopt or deploy a level of scrutiny to ana213. Id. at 448–49.
214. Id. at 448.
215. Id. at 451.
216. See Joseph Russomanno, “Freedom for the Thought That We Hate”: Why Westboro
Had to Win, 17 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 133, 148 (2012) (“[T]he Court took it upon itself to
determine whether the speech at issue in Snyder v. Phelps was on matters of public concern. If so, First Amendment protection would be more likely to overcome a tort liability
claim.”).
217. Under this test, speech regards a matter of public concern either “when it can ‘be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community’ or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general
interest and of value and concern to the public.’” Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453 (citation omitted)
(first quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); then quoting City of San Diego
v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)). The Court noted that three variables—the content,
form, and context of speech—must be examined in the public-concern determination. Id. It
added that “[i]n considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is
necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it
was said, and how it was said.” Id. at 454.
218. Id. at 454.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 461 (“As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on
public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we
shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.”).
221. For example, a federal appellate court recently held that whether negative commentary by a radio sports program and its employees about the performance of a college
basketball referee was presumptively protected by the First Amendment from tort liability
for seven causes of action, including theories such as intentional infliction of emotional
distress, invasion of privacy and negligence, “turn[ed] on whether the speech involve[d] a
‘public or private concern.’” Higgins v. Ky. Sports Radio, LLC, 951 F.3d 728, 734 (6th Cir.
2020) (quoting Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451); see also Gersh v. Anglin, 353 F. Supp. 3d 958, 964
(D. Mont. 2018) (“[I]n cases brought under state tort law, where the cause of action is not
itself subject to a facial challenge, the first question is ‘whether [the] speech is of public or
private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451)).
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lyze the constitutionality of a statute barring or otherwise limiting speech.
It was a tort case.
The court in Austin, as noted above, also relied on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet to support its conclusion that intermediate scrutiny applied because the speech barred by Illinois’s revenge
pornography statute was of private concern.222 Dun & Bradstreet, however, was a defamation action—not a statutory analysis—that examined
the standard of fault a plaintiff must prove in order to recover presumed
and punitive damages when the defamatory speech is about a matter of
private concern.223 The Court concluded that “permitting recovery of
presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases absent a showing of
‘actual malice’ does not violate the First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern.”224
In brief, both Snyder and Dun & Bradstreet were tort cases in which
the Supreme Court drew distinctions between speech about matters of
public concern and speech about matters of private concern. The Court
also made it clear in this pair of opinions that restricting or punishing
speech about matters of public concern is more problematic, at least from
a First Amendment perspective, than is restricting or punishing speech
regarding a purely private matter.225 For instance, the Court in Snyder
opined that “where matters of purely private significance are at issue,
First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.”226 Neither case,
however, involved the Court venturing a decision about the level of scrutiny to apply to examine the validity of a statute under the First
Amendment.
Nonetheless, the Illinois Supreme Court used the two cases for precisely that scrutiny-determining purpose. It concluded that intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate because “the nonconsensual dissemination of
the victim’s private sexual images was not an issue of public concern.”227
222. See People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 54, petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1029 (U.S.
Feb. 14, 2020).
223. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(“In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive
damages—even absent a showing of ‘actual malice.’” (emphasis added)). In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), the Court held that public officials suing
for libel based upon speech regarding their official conduct must prove that the defamatory
statement at issue “was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”
224. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763.
225. See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (“Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place
on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First
Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses
contempt.” (emphasis added)); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758–59 (“We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’”
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 776 (1978))).
226. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452.
227. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 56.
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The court reasoned, in key part, that the sexual images Bethany Austin
forwarded to prove what happened to her relationship with Matthew did
“not relate to any broad issue of interest to society at large” and that “the
public has no legitimate interest in the private sexual activities of the victim or in the embarrassing facts revealed about her life.”228 Intermediate
scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, was thus appropriate.229 The Supreme Court
of Illinois, in turn, upheld the revenge pornography statute under that
level of review.230
In summary, when confronted with a facially content-based statute
criminalizing the low-value yet—in light of United States v. Stevens—
likely First Amendment-protected speech known as revenge pornography, the Supreme Court of Illinois cleverly found two workarounds for
Reed v. Town of Gilbert’s admonition that strict scrutiny should apply to
test the measure’s validity. First, the court turned to Ward v. Rock
Against Racism for the pre-Reed rule that the government’s purpose controls whether a law is content based or content neutral. It then leaned on
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.—particularly its contested secondary effects doctrine—for an example of a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a law affecting sexual expression was deemed
content neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny because the
predominate legislative concern underlying the law was not censoring
speech, but rather reducing the adverse secondary effects that businesses
that traffic in sexual content ostensibly cause. Next, the Supreme Court of
Illinois invented a new rule that statutes regulating speech about private
matters are subject to review under intermediate scrutiny. It did so citing
only the tort cases of Snyder v. Phelps and Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., neither of which involved a statutory analysis under a
tier of First Amendment scrutiny.
These innovative and dubious efforts to avoid strict scrutiny under
Reed are, of course, controversial. In February 2020, Bethany Austin filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.231 The brief
asked the Court to “settle what level of scrutiny should govern review of
such [revenge pornography] laws to ensure they are consistent with the
First Amendment.”232 Among other items, the brief slammed the Supreme Court of Illinois’s decision to declare the law content neutral and
to apply intermediate scrutiny, contending that decision “flatly contradicts the holding in Reed and a host of other decisions by this Court.”233
Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case in

228.
229.
230.
231.
2020).
232.
233.

Id.
Id. ¶ 57.
See id. ¶ 86 (“We hold that section 11-23.5 satisfies intermediate scrutiny.”).
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Austin v. Illinois, No. 19-1029 (U.S. Feb. 14,
Id. at 3.
Id. at 14.
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October 2020, thus leaving intact the Supreme Court of Illinois’s rather
inventive ruling.234
The next Section examines how two other courts in 2019 also found
workarounds for the lockboxes of Stevens and Reed when faced with statutes regulating another variety of low-value speech—namely, SOCE on
minors.
B. EVADING STRICT SCRUTINY WHEN ANALYZING LAWS BANNING
SOCE ON MINORS
This Section features two subsections, each of which examines a different 2019 ruling regarding the level of scrutiny that applies when analyzing
the validity of a statute banning SOCE on minors. Specifically, Subsection 1 addresses U.S. District Judge Chasanow’s decision considering Maryland’s anti-SOCE statute in the face of a First Amendment free speech
challenge in Doyle v. Hogan.235 Subsection 2 then reviews U.S. District
Judge Rosenberg’s opinion evaluating the constitutionality of two local
South Florida ordinances banning SOCE on minors in Otto v. City of
Boca Raton.236
1. Doyle v. Hogan
In September 2019, Judge Chasanow concluded that a Maryland statute banning mental-health and childcare practitioners from performing
SOCE on minors was subject to review under intermediate scrutiny when
determining if it violated the First Amendment speech rights of such
practitioners.237 The judge then upheld the statute under this relaxed
form of review and dismissed plaintiff Christopher Doyle’s free speech
claim in the process.238
Doyle’s free speech theory hinged on the logic that, “because he primarily uses speech to provide counseling to his minor clients, the act of
counseling must be construed as speech for purposes of First Amendment
review.”239 He argued that the statute was a content-based regulation
subject to strict scrutiny.240
Judge Chasanow readily acknowledged that Maryland’s anti-SOCE
statute “regulates speech by prohibiting the use of language employed in
234. Austin v. Illinois, No. 19-1029, 2020 WL 5882221 (Oct. 5, 2020).
235. 411 F. Supp. 3d 337 (D. Md. 2019).
236. 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237 (S.D. Fla. 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-10604 (11th Cir. filed
Feb. 14, 2019).
237. See Doyle, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 346 (concluding that “intermediate scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of review”); see also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 1-212.1(b)
(LexisNexis 2020) (“A mental health or child care practitioner may not engage in conversion therapy with an individual who is a minor.”).
238. See Doyle, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 348 (“[Doyle] failed to state a free speech claim upon
which relief can be granted because [the statute] would survive a constitutional challenge
under intermediate scrutiny.”).
239. Id. at 344.
240. See id. at 343–44.
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the process of conducting conversion therapy on minor clients.”241 Yet,
for Judge Chasanow, conversion therapy—at least as Maryland regulates
it—is much more akin to conduct than to speech.242 That seems to be the
case for Judge Chasanow largely due to two reasons. First, practitioners
such as Christopher Doyle remain completely free to espouse their own
views and beliefs about SOCE and its merits.243 Second, the statute regulates only speech that is part of a course of therapy and is thus “inherently not expressive because the speech involved does not seek to
communicate Plaintiff’s views.”244
This latter observation is critical. It suggests that only when an individual is attempting to deliver his or her own personal opinions, beliefs, or
ideas on a particular topic are the full panoply of First Amendment protections for speech triggered to shield such expression from government
censorship. In contrast, as in Doyle, when the speech merely follows a
therapeutic script and is implemented as a form of treatment, then First
Amendment concerns are dramatically diminished, thereby making possible the application of a lower standard of judicial review such as intermediate scrutiny. As Judge Chasanow put it, Christopher Doyle’s “free
speech claim turns on ‘whether verbal communications become “conduct” when they are used as a vehicle for mental health treatment.’”245
In brief, Judge Chasanow exploited the traditional dichotomy between
speech and conduct in First Amendment jurisprudence.246 Under this distinction, regulations of conduct generally do not trigger First Amendment
concerns unless the conduct is deemed symbolic expression, such as burning the American flag as a form of political protest.247 Judge Chasanow
took advantage of this dichotomy by moving Christopher Doyle’s SOCE
241. Id. at 345.
242. See id. at 344–45 (stating that “[d]etermining the proper level of review first requires distinguishing whether [the statute] regulates speech, conduct, or something in between,” and then later concluding that the statute “lands on the conduct end of the sliding
scale”).
243. See id. at 345 (“Most importantly, [the statute] does not prohibit practitioners from
engaging in any form of personal expression; they remain free to discuss, endorse, criticize,
or recommend conversion therapy to their minor clients.”).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 344 (quoting King v. Governor, 767 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated
by Nat’l Inst. of Fam & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
246. For example, Justice Thomas recently explained that “[w]hile drawing the line between speech and conduct can be difficult, this Court’s precedents have long drawn it.”
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; see also Diahann Dasilva, Note, Playing a “Labeling Game”:
Classifying Expression as Conduct as a Means of Circumventing First Amendment Analysis,
56 B.C. L. REV. 767, 769–70 (2015) (noting “the speech versus conduct dichotomy” and
examining the “distinction between speech and conduct, the implications of that distinction, and how courts have classified various activities as speech or conduct”).
247. See R. Randall Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine, 52 IND. L. REV. 355, 356 (2019) (noting that “[g]overnmental regulations of conduct
. . . are outside of the ambit of the First Amendment,” but pointing out that “the Court has
noted that ‘symbolic speech’” is fully protected by the First Amendment,” such as “burning a draft card or cross . . . to convey a particular message”); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 399, 404–06 (1989) (concluding that Gregory Lee Johnson’s burning of the American flag outside of the Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas, in 1984 constituted expressive conduct and thus implicated First Amendment coverage).
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speech (as regulated by the statute) closer to the conduct end of the continuum. The lynchpin logic for this maneuver was the judge’s assertion
that “conduct is not confined merely to physical action.”248 If conduct is
not limited to physical action, then this opens the door for conduct to
expansively encompass the spoken word.
Judge Chasanow, however, is not alone in exploiting the speech-versusconduct dichotomy in order to apply a deferential level of judicial review
to a law barring speech-based SOCE on minors. Perhaps most notably,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in 2014 that California’s anti-SOCE statute “regulates conduct. It bans a form of treatment
for minors; it does nothing to prevent licensed therapists from discussing
the pros and cons of SOCE with their patients.”249 In other words, the
therapists can talk about SOCE with patients, but they just cannot use
speech as the vehicle for treatment.250 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Pickup
v. Brown was able to find that “the First Amendment does not prevent a
state from regulating treatment even when that treatment is performed
through speech alone.”251 California’s anti-SOCE statute, therefore, was
“subject to only rational basis review and must be upheld if it bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.”252 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that California’s statute passed muster under this test.253
Rational basis review is a very deferential level of scrutiny.254 It does
not, in fact, generally apply in First Amendment cases, but rather applies
in disputes involving non-fundamental rights where the government
adopts social and economic regulations.255 As Justice Alito recently
248. Doyle, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 345 (emphasis added).
249. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th Cir. 2014).
250. See Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, 97 N.C. L. REV. 843, 879
(2019) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pickup . . . distinguished between laws interfering with communications about medical treatment and laws regulating medical treatment
carried out through the mechanism of speech.”).
251. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1230.
252. Id. at 1231; see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and
Psychotherapy, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 683 (2016) (“In the view of the Ninth Circuit,
California’s talk therapy restriction did not violate the First Amendment because talk therapy is not protected by the First Amendment. In short, the Ninth Circuit held in Pickup v.
Brown that such therapy is conduct not speech.” (footnote omitted)).
253. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1232 (“[W]e hold that [California’s anti-SOCE law] is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting the well-being of
minors.”).
254. See Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L. REV. 61, 64
(2017) (“[R]ational basis review ostensibly asks judges to deferentially review reasonable
government decisions . . . .”).
255. Nearly eighty years ago, the Supreme Court explained the principle that rational
basis review generally does not apply in First Amendment cases, writing:
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include,
so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a ‘rational basis’ for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be
infringed on such slender grounds.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); see R. Randall Kelso, The
Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 291 (2016) (“Because free speech doctrine
involves the ‘fundamental’ right of speech, modern free speech doctrine does not use mini-
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wrote, rational basis review constitutes a “form of minimal scrutiny [that]
is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence.”256 Only “[l]ow-value speech
triggers rational basis review,”257 with a “strong presumption of constitutional validity”258 for such regulation.
Ultimately, Judge Chasanow’s 2019 decision to adopt intermediate
scrutiny in Doyle illustrates another workaround for applying strict scrutiny when a statute seemingly is content based on its face—namely, by
contending that the law primarily regulates conduct, with speech being
swept up only incidentally.259 Her decision, however, is highly problematic to the extent that she partly relied on the fact that the statute regulated the speech of professionals speaking in their professional
capacities.260 In the 2018 decision of National Institute of Family & Life
Advocates v. Becerra,261 a five-Justice majority of the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the notion that the speech of professionals—what the
Court called “professional speech”262—is generally exempt from Reed’s
“rule that content-based regulations of speech are subject to strict scrutiny.”263 In writing for the majority, Justice Thomas cited the Ninth Cirmum rationality review, applicable to cases of social or economic regulation not involving
fundamental rights under the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses.” (footnote omitted)); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 403 (2016) (“[T]he Court has basically gotten it right
about when to apply the rational basis test—using it to analyze government economic regulations and social welfare legislation when there is no discrimination based on a suspect
classification or infringement of a fundamental right.”).
256. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465 (2018).
257. Wynter K. Miller & Benjamin E. Berkman, The Future of Physicians’ First Amendment Freedom: Professional Speech in an Era of Radically Expanded Prenatal Genetic Testing, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577, 607 (2019).
258. Id.
259. See Doyle v. Hogan, 411 F. Supp. 3d 337, 346 (D. Md. 2019) (“According to the
Fourth Circuit, ‘intermediate scrutiny strikes the appropriate balance between the states’
police powers and individual rights[ ]’ when evaluating ‘conduct regulations that incidentally impact speech.’ Consequently, intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of
review.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Cap. Associated Indus. v. Stein,
922 F.3d 198, 209 (4th Cir. 2019))).
260. See id. at 344 (contending that “government regulations of professional practices
that entail and incidentally burden speech receive deferential review,” and pointing out
that Maryland’s anti-SOCE statute “obviously regulates professionals”).
261. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
262. Id. at 2371.
263. Id. In Becerra, the majority cited Reed for the principle that content-based laws,
“[a]s a general matter,” are subject to the “stringent standard” that is strict scrutiny. Id.
Justice Thomas concluded for the majority that “neither California nor the Ninth Circuit
has identified a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category
that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles.” Id. at 2375.
Justice Thomas, however, indicated that there are two narrow situations where the
speech of professionals is subject to lesser review than strict scrutiny. The first is where
professionals, in their advertising or commercial speech, are required to disclose purely
factual, noncontroversial information related to the services they provide. Id. at 2372.
These situations, Justice Thomas noted, are controlled by the Court’s ruling in Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. The second
situation is when the government regulates professional conduct and such “conduct incidentally involves speech.” Id. The primary example of this situation cited by Justice
Thomas was the informed-consent mandate imposed on doctors before they could perform
abortions in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
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cuit’s decision in Pickup v. Brown, the California anti-SOCE statute case
of Pickup v. Brown, which was addressed earlier in this Subsection, as an
example of a court that “recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate
category of speech that is subject to different rules.”264 Indeed, as Robert
McNamara and Paul Sherman, senior attorneys at the Institute for Justice
point out, the Ninth Circuit in Pickup had relied on this conception of
professional speech to hold that the statute there only regulated conduct,
not speech.265 Becerra thus casts considerable doubt on the continued viability of Pickup’s professional-speech workaround for strict scrutiny in
anti-SOCE law cases.266 As Dean Rodney Smolla bluntly puts it, “[t]he
professional speech doctrine crashed and burned in” in Becerra.267
This is not to say that anti-SOCE statutes would fail to survive strict
scrutiny were it to be applied; indeed, these laws might well pass muster
under that test.268 Rather, it is to say that the court’s ruling in Doyle v.
Hogan represents another workaround—one pivoting on the distinction
between speech and conduct, and deeming speech to be regulated only
incidental to conduct—from strict scrutiny in the face of Reed that greatly
enhances the likelihood such regulations of low-value speech will pass
constitutional muster.

(1992). Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; see Clay Calvert, Wither Zauderer, Blossom Heightened
Scrutiny? How the Supreme Court’s 2018 Rulings in Becerra and Janus Exacerbate
Problems with Compelled-Speech Jurisprudence, 76 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1409–11
(2019) (addressing Justice Thomas’s analysis in Becerra of these two exceptions from the
general rule that laws regulating professional speech are subject to strict scrutiny).
264. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.
265. See Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, NIFLA v. Becerra: A Seismic Decision
Protecting Occupational Speech, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 197, 210 (“The panel in Pickup,
applying the professional-speech doctrine, had concluded that talk therapy was simply a
form of professional conduct, entitled to no First Amendment protection.”).
266. See Calvert, supra note 64, at 29–30 (contending that “[t]he Supreme Court’s 2018
ruling in Becerra, with its attack on a nascent professional speech doctrine, casts serious
doubt on whether any lesser standard [than strict scrutiny] should apply” when reviewing
anti-SOCE statutes).
267. Rodney A. Smolla, The Tensions Between Regulation of the Legal Profession and
Protection of the First Amendment Rights of Lawyers and Judges: A Tribute to Ronald
Rotunda, 22 CHAP. L. REV. 285, 291 (2019). Dean Smolla’s assertion might be viewed as
somewhat of an overstatement, at least to the extent that the Court did not completely
preclude the prospect that professional speech might, under some situations, be subject to
different rules as its own category of expression. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375 (“In sum,
neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles. We do not foreclose the possibility that some such reason exists.”).
268. Professor Mark Strasser recently contended that anti-SOCE statutes at issue in
cases such as Pickup might have been deemed constitutional “even had a higher level of
scrutiny been employed. States have a compelling interest in protecting the health of the
populace, and prohibitions on treatments that are not only ineffective but also pose a risk
of significant harm are closely tailored to promoting that state interest.” Mark Strasser,
Deception, Professional Speech, and CPCs: On Becerra, Abortion, and the First Amendment, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 311, 336–37 (2019) (footnote omitted).
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2. Otto v. City of Boca Raton
In Otto v. City of Boca Raton,269 Judge Rosenberg considered a First
Amendment free speech attack on ordinances in the City of Boca Raton
and Palm Beach County, Florida, banning SOCE on minors.270 She reviewed the challenge in February 2019 within the context of a motion for
a preliminary injunction to block the ordinances’ enforcement against
two licensed therapists who sought to perform SOCE via talk therapy.271
In determining the applicable degree of First Amendment scrutiny—
which directly affected the likelihood of success of the therapists’ case on
its merits and, therefore, their ability to garner injunctive relief272—Judge
Rosenberg observed that the Supreme Court’s decisions in both Reed and
Becerra “raise[d] questions as to the validity of the” Ninth Circuit’s ruling
in Pickup, described above in Subsection 1.273 This, however, was not the
only problem she faced in fathoming the relevant standard of review. In
fact, she deemed it “unsettled” whether strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review should apply,274 and she pointed out that the
parties “vigorously contest[ed]” the scrutiny issue.275 Indeed, the judge
flatly rejected the notion that following a categorical methodology or
formula for classifying the anti-SOCE ordinances as either content based
or content neutral would necessarily resolve the scrutiny
determination.276
Disappointingly, however, for legal scholars and practitioners seeking
exactitude, Judge Rosenberg ultimately hedged her bets on scrutiny at
the preliminary injunction stage. Specifically, she concluded it was “unclear what standard of review should apply to this case”277 and “decline[d] to announce a standard of review.”278 Instead of picking one
standard, she analyzed the two ordinances through the prisms of all three
tests, holding that they would pass constitutional muster under both rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny.279 While the judge dubbed
it a “closer call” as to whether the measures would survive strict scrutiny,
269. 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237 (S.D. Fla. 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-10604 (11th Cir. filed
Feb. 14, 2019).
270. See BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-106 (2020) (“It shall be unlawful for any provider to practice conversion therapy on any individual who is a minor regardless of whether the provider receives monetary compensation in exchange for such
services.”); PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-125 (2020) (“It shall
be unlawful for any Provider to engage in conversion therapy on any minor regardless of
whether the Provider receives monetary compensation in exchange for such services.”).
271. Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1241.
272. To obtain a preliminary injunction, one factor Judge Rosenberg considered was
whether the plaintiffs had “demonstrate[d] that they have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Id.
273. Id. at 1249.
274. Id. at 1242.
275. Id. at 1248.
276. See id. at 1256 (“[T]his case demonstrates why an unbending, categorical approach
to the First Amendment proves unwieldy to the point of unworkable.”).
277. Id. at 1258.
278. Id. at 1270.
279. Id.
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she nonetheless ruled against the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction because, under all three tiers of analysis, she was not persuaded
that the plaintiffs had a substantial likelihood of winning on the merits.280
Most importantly for purposes of this Article, however, Judge Rosenberg offered a possible workaround for Reed’s mandate that facially content-based laws must presumptively surmount strict scrutiny. Unpacking
Rosenberg’s analysis on a step-by-step basis reveals why she personally
believed—albeit without definitively adopting it—that “intermediate review may be the correct standard to apply.”281
Initially, Judge Rosenberg rejected the notion that the ordinances
merely regulated conduct (i.e., therapy) or affected speech only incidentally to such conduct.282 Because she found that speech was at issue—
unlike the Ninth Circuit when considering California’s anti-SOCE statute
in Pickup—Rosenberg concluded that rational basis review was likely inappropriate and that, instead, the pair of South Florida ordinances “must
be reviewed under intermediate or strict scrutiny.”283
Second, she acknowledged that, under Reed, the ordinances seemingly
were content-based measures that would need to face strict scrutiny.284
Yet, she pushed back against Reed’s presumption that strict scrutiny
should apply. Specifically, she reasoned that the case before her did not
implicate what she called “a heartland content-based speech regulation.”285 By that, she apparently meant that the ordinances:
1. did not regulate or otherwise discriminate against the content of
speech occurring in a public forum, such as a park or a street, where
it would have been especially problematic under the First Amendment;286 and
2. only barred the content of speech within the narrow context of
therapy, not outside of it, thus leaving SOCE advocates and adversaries free to hold either private or public conversations about its merits or drawbacks.287
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1258.
282. Id. at 1251–52.
283. Id. at 1252.
284. See id. at 1253 (“The ordinances identify certain speech—speech aimed at changing minor patients’ sexual orientation—for prohibition because the speech constitutes conversion therapy. The ordinances target what Plaintiffs say to their minor patients.”); see
also id. at 1242 (“The ordinances also arguably are content-based, as they apply ‘to particular speech because of the topics discussed or the idea or message expressed.’”).
285. Id. at 1242.
286. See id. (“No public forum restrictions exist in the ordinances.”); see also McCullen
v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014) (“In particular, the guiding First Amendment principle
that the ‘government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content’ applies with full force in a traditional public forum.”
(quoting Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))).
287. See Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1242 (noting that “[t]he ordinances define the reach of
their prohibitions by topic or subject matter, but they do so only to identify the type of
therapy covered, not the content of communications outside of the therapy itself,” and
adding that they “do not prohibit or limit proponents or opponents of conversion therapy
to speak about gender or sexual orientation conversion publicly and privately, including to
their minor clients in forms other than therapy”).
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Closely tied to this second reason for Judge Rosenberg in suggesting
that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate were the dual facts that the
speakers who were regulated under the ordinances were “licensed medical professional[s]”288 and that their speech was regulated only to the extent that it is the actual method for delivering medical treatment.289
Citing Becerra, however, she was careful not to rely on the notion that
professional speech constitutes a separate category of expression subject
to something less rigorous than strict scrutiny when it is regulated.290 Instead, she leaned on the Supreme Court’s 1992 ruling in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.291 The Court there
held that physicians, as licensed professionals, could be compelled by the
government to provide information to patients about the risks of abortion
without violating the physicians’ First Amendment freedom of speech—
in particular, an unenumerated right not to speak—because that right was
implicated “only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State.”292 This use of “reasonable” in upholding this informed-consent requirement suggests a standard far less
rigorous than strict scrutiny was applied in Casey.293 Importantly, the Supreme Court in Becerra cited Casey approvingly in holding that “regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech”294
constitute one of two narrow circumstances where the “Court has afforded less protection for professional speech.”295 Judge Rosenberg reasoned in Otto that the treatment regulated by the two anti-SOCE
ordinances was “both speech and conduct—directed at minors—administered by a licensed medical professional, as part of ‘the practice of
288. Id. at 1256.
289. See id. (“The speech not only is directly related to the treatment, it is the manner of
delivering the treatment. Plaintiffs are essentially writing a prescription for a treatment that
will be carried out verbally.”).
290. See id. (noting that Becerra “disparaged the use of ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech” and concluding that “[i]t is not clear that a separate category for
professional speech is required to recognize this case’s unique features”).
291. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
292. Id. at 884 (plurality opinion). The Court in Casey concluded that the compelledspeech mandate imposed on physicians was “a reasonable means to ensure that the woman’s consent is informed.” Id. at 885.
The Supreme Court long has recognized the existence of a First Amendment right not to
be forced by the government to speak. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)
(“We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all.” (emphasis added)).
293. See Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, 97 N.C. L. REV. 843, 851
(2019) (“[The Court’s] use of the word ‘reasonable’ might mean that such laws are permissible as long as they have a rational basis, given that the word ‘reasonable’ is often used as
a synonym for ‘rational.’”); B. Jessie Hill, Sex, Lies, and Ultrasound, 89 U. COLO. L. REV.
421, 432 (2018) (“The Court’s language of reasonableness, along with its dismissive treatment of the claim, suggest something like rational basis review was applied to the physician’s free speech claim.”).
294. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018).
295. Id. at 2372.
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medicine,’ as in Casey.”296 This allowed her to conclude that intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate.297 In brief, the judge both recognized that
Becerra cast serious doubt upon the professional speech doctrine and attempted to chart a way around that obstacle by turning to Casey, which
the Court in Becerra had reaffirmed.
Judge Rosenberg, however, did not stop her scrutiny-selection analysis
there. Citing Justice Breyer298 and taking a page out of his playbook (addressed later in Part V), she delved into what she called “the historic
understandings of the First Amendment and its purpose.”299 At the top
of the list for Judge Rosenberg was the goal—one described earlier in
Part III of this Article300—of safeguarding an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in order to produce and test conceptions of the truth.301 She also
cited the principle that individual self-expression should be free from
government control, as well as the notion that political speech is “highly
protected,” especially when it arises “in the metaphoric or literal ‘public
square.’”302
Judge Rosenberg concluded that deploying intermediate scrutiny in the
case before her was “entirely consistent” with these core First Amendment goals and policies.303 That was the situation, she reasoned, largely
because the anti-SOCE statutes neither restricted the public marketplace
of ideas about SOCE nor targeted political speech about it in public venues.304 The only function served by the restricted speech, in turn, was
simply as a means of individual therapy, while the only context in which it
was restricted was within the confines of a private therapist–patient relationship.305 In other words, the ordinances in Otto did not in any way
stifle public debate about SOCE or hinder a marketplace-like quest for
the truth about whether SOCE are effective or harmful. As Judge Rosenberg bluntly put it, “In the context of the relationship between a minor
and his or her therapist, there is no competitive marketplace of ideas to
infringe upon.”306 Proponents of SOCE remain free under the ordinances
to lobby and advocate in various marketplaces of ideas, including in the
political-idea marketplaces that are state and local legislative bodies, for
296. Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2019), appeal
filed, No. 19-10604 (11th Cir. filed Feb. 14, 2019).
297. See id. (“Accordingly, applying intermediate scrutiny to medical treatments that
are effectuated through speech would strike the appropriate balance between recognizing
that doctors maintain some freedom of speech within their offices, and acknowledging that
treatments may be subject to significant regulation under the government’s police
powers.”).
298. Id. at 1256–57.
299. Id. at 1257.
300. See supra notes 101–115 and accompanying text (addressing the marketplace of
ideas and its truth-seeking goal).
301. Otto, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1257.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1257–58.
306. Id. at 1258.
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laws permitting the adoption and use of SOCE.307
Judge Rosenberg’s decision to consider traditional First Amendment
interests and principles—most significantly, the marketplace of ideas—
readily distinguishes her workaround for strict scrutiny in Otto from
Judge Chasanow’s workaround in her September 2019 decision in Doyle
addressed in Subsection 1. Judge Chasanow, as noted above, focused almost exclusively in her scrutiny determination on where speech-based
SOCE, uttered by professionals, is situated on a continuum between
speech, on one end, and conduct, on the other.308 Rosenberg’s evaluation
of the historical rationales for protecting speech not only gave her additional legal cover in suggesting that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate
in the face of Reed but also echoed Justice Breyer’s logic in applying his
proportionality framework for scrutiny, which is examined immediately
below.
V. A BETTER WORKAROUND FOR REED IN LOW-VALUE
SPEECH CASES INVOLVING REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY AND
CONVERSION THERAPY? EVALUATING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT VALUES AND INTERESTS AT STAKE TO
DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court in Iancu v. Brunetti held that part of a
federal statute granting the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
authority to deny registration for immoral or scandalous trademarks violated the First Amendment.309 The majority concluded that both facets of
this provision—the term “immoral,” as well as the term “scandalous”—
were unconstitutional because they authorized the government to engage
in impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination against speech.310 That
conclusion, in turn, allowed Erik Brunetti, who challenged the immoral
or scandalous provision, to register the trademark “FUCT” with the
USPTO for branding a line of clothing.311 The USPTO earlier had used
307. See id. at 1257 (“The ordinances do not limit or change in any way advocacy for
SOCE. Plaintiffs retain their right and prerogative to seek greater acceptance of SOCE, to
lobby Defendants to repeal the ordinances, and to lobby the State of Florida to explicitly
preempt the ordinances.”).
308. See supra notes 237–248 and accompanying text.
309. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019); see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (allowing
the PTO to deny registration for a trademark that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral . . .
or scandalous matter”).
310. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299; see also Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein,
Toward a More Explicit, Independent, Consistent and Nuanced Compelled Speech Doctrine,
2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (“Viewpoint-discriminatory laws are uniquely violative of the
First Amendment because they directly empower one side of a debate with weapons that
are denied to the proponents of the other side. This distorts the ability of the participants
to fairly compete on the merits of their ideas.” (quoting Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of
Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 553, 591 (1996))).
311. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297 (“Respondent Erik Brunetti is an artist and entrepreneur who founded a clothing line that uses the trademark FUCT. According to
Brunetti, the mark (which functions as the clothing’s brand name) is pronounced as four
letters, one after the other: F-U-C-T.”).
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the measure to block his registration, finding that “FUCT”: (1) had sexual connotations, (2) was offensive and vulgar, and (3) was used by
Brunetti in marketing contexts that were violent, nihilistic, and
misogynistic.312
Several Justices, however, fretted that the outcome in Brunetti would
give the greenlight for registering all types of offensive marks that are
seemingly of low value—perhaps, even no value—when it comes to serving traditional First Amendment interests and goals. For instance, Justice
Alito urged Congress to craft
a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of
marks containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression
of ideas. The particular mark in question in this case could be denied
registration under such a statute. The term suggested by that mark is
not needed to express any idea and, in fact, as commonly used today,
generally signifies nothing except emotion and a severely limited
vocabulary.313
A close reading of this passage reveals that it parallels the Court’s language from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,314 the seminal low-value
speech case addressed earlier in Part III , explaining when speech can be
restricted without raising any First Amendment concerns.315 Specifically,
the Court in Chaplinsky reasoned that unprotected speech plays “no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”316 Justice Alito in Brunetti neatly
paraphrased this sentiment in the italicized part of his quotation above, as
he simply substituted “real” for “essential” and “expression” for
“exposition.”
Justice Breyer also agreed the speech regulated in Brunetti was of low
value and, indeed, might even be harmful.317 Justice Breyer, in fact, took
Justice Alito’s focus on the low-value nature of the speech to another
level, as it were, by arguing that the “scandalous” provision (although not
the “immoral” terminology) did not violate the First Amendment.318 In
reaching this conclusion, he rejected the application of an inflexible categorical approach to First Amendment review under which categorizing a
312. Id. at 2298.
313. Id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
314. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
315. See id. at 571–72.
316. Id. at 572.
317. As Justice Breyer explained, highly vulgar trademarks do not typically convey any
viewpoints, but instead traffic only in emotions. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). He pointed to harms that protecting them through
federal registration might cause, reasoning:
These attention-grabbing words, though financially valuable to some businesses that seek to attract interest in their products, threaten to distract consumers and disrupt commerce. And they may lead to the creation of public
spaces that many will find repellant, perhaps on occasion creating the risk of
verbal altercations or even physical confrontations.
Id. at 2307. He also noted the harm to children that might occur from being exposed to
them. See id.
318. Id. at 2308.
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statute as discriminating against content would necessarily lead to the application of strict scrutiny.319 Instead of following that formula, Justice
Breyer averred that the Court should resolve First Amendment questions
by “appeal[ing] more often and more directly to the values the First
Amendment seeks to protect”320 and, in particular, asking whether the
harm worked to those values by a statute is disproportionate to the justifications underlying the statute.321 This, in a nutshell, is what Justice
Breyer calls a “proportionality analysis.”322
It was not the first time he promoted this methodology.323 For example, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Justice Breyer advocated for a proportionality approach to scrutiny, pushing back directly against the Court’s
conclusion that, as described in this Article’s Introduction, facially content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny.324 Justice Breyer reasoned in
Reed that “content discrimination, while helping courts to identify unconstitutional suppression of expression, cannot and should not always trigger strict scrutiny.”325 Instead, focus must be directed to “the [First]
Amendment’s expressive objectives,”326 and determining a statute’s validity requires analysis of “the seriousness of the harm to speech, the importance of the countervailing objectives, the extent to which the law will
achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive

319. Id. at 2304–05; see also Kent Greenfield, Trademarks, Hate Speech, and Solving a
Puzzle of Viewpoint Bias, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 215 (noting that in Brunetti, Justice
Breyer “set out his broader critique of the Court’s free speech jurisprudence as too formalistic and categorically rigid”). Justice Breyer reinforced his stance against a rigid categorical approach to scrutiny in 2020. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335,
2359 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment regarding severability and dissenting in
part) (“To reflexively treat all content-based distinctions as subject to strict scrutiny regardless of context or practical effect is to engage in an analysis untethered from the First
Amendment’s objectives.”).
320. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2305 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
321. See id. Justice Breyer reiterated this point later in Brunetti, writing that “[r]ather
than puzzling over categorization, I believe we should focus on the interests the First
Amendment protects and ask a more basic proportionality question: Does ‘the regulation
at issue wor[k] harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the
relevant regulatory objectives’?” Id. at 2306 (alteration in original) (quoting Reed v. Town
of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 179 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
322. Id. at 2306.
323. See Jamal Greene, Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 55 (2018) (“Proportionality and balancing approaches to rights have long found favor with Justice Breyer.”).
324. See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text (addressing Reed’s principle that
facially content-based laws trigger strict scrutiny, regardless of legislative motive).
325. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 176 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice
Breyer emphasized in Reed his stance that “the category ‘content discrimination’ is better
considered in many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.” Id.
326. Id. at 175.
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ways of doing so.”327 This, ultimately, is a balancing approach.328 It is
widely embraced in Europe, but not in the United States.329
Focusing on values is critical for Justice Breyer in this balancing approach because values constitute “the constitutional analogue of statutory purposes.”330 Put differently, constitutional purposes (i.e., First
Amendment values) for protecting speech are weighed against legislative
(i.e., statutory) purposes for restricting speech, with courts asking
“whether the restriction on speech is proportionate to, or properly balances, the need.”331
Under this methodology for scrutiny, Justice Breyer has made it clear
that “interests close to the First Amendment’s protective core”—the values that necessitate analyzing a statute “with great care” when they are
placed in jeopardy—are “the processes through which political discourse
or public opinion is formed or expressed.”332 In brief, as Justice Breyer
put it, “[T]he First Amendment imposes tight constraints upon government efforts to restrict . . . ‘core’ political speech.”333 For Justice Breyer,
“the constitutional importance of maintaining a free marketplace of
ideas” rests on the ability of the public to have access to a wide variety of
ideas that allow it to “freely choose a government pledged to implement
policies that reflect the people’s informed will.”334 Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach thus involves, as it did in United States v. Alvarez,335 consideration of whether the regulation in question risks
suppressing ideas that may “make a valuable contribution to the marketplace of ideas.”336
327. Id. at 179. Justice Breyer reiterated this analytical framework in 2020. See Barr v.
Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2362 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment regarding severability and dissenting in part) (“A proper inquiry should examine the
seriousness of the speech-related harm, the importance of countervailing objectives, the
likelihood that the restriction will achieve those objectives, and whether there are other,
less restrictive ways of doing so.”).
328. Donald L. Beschle, Fake News, Deliberate Lies, and the First Amendment, 44 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 209, 221 (2019) (“Proportionality, as Justice Breyer explains, is a balancing test.”).
329. See Floyd Abrams, Free Speech Under Fire: The Future of the First Amendment,
Keynote Remarks, in 25 J.L. & POL’Y 47, 58 (2016) (noting that Justice Breyer’s opinions
“repeatedly seek to apply the concept of proportionality” and are “closer to those adopted
in European nations in interpreting their more limited free speech protections under the
European Convention on Human Rights”); Mark S. Kende, The Unmasking of Balancing
and Proportionality Review in U.S. Constitutional Law, 25 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMPAR.
L. 417, 424 (2017) (“[P]roportionality review took the world by storm after World War II
with many nations having a key case, except the U.S.”).
330. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 162
(2010).
331. Id. at 164.
332. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); see Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2358 (2020)
(Breyer, J., concurring in judgment regarding severability and dissenting in part) (“For our
government to remain a democratic republic, the people must be free to generate, debate,
and discuss both general and specific ideas, hopes, and experiences.”).
333. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 582 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
334. Id. at 583.
335. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
336. Id. at 732 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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This, of course, ties directly back to Part III of this Article and the two
core First Amendment values addressed there—promoting a diverse public marketplace of ideas, with truth-seeking and truth-testing goals, and
facilitating wise and informed decision-making and participation by citizens in democratic self-governance.337 When such objectives are
threatened by a law, Justice Breyer’s approach would call for, as noted
above, analyzing a statute “with great care.”338 This seemingly means
strict scrutiny.
When such core constitutional values and interests do not rest in the
balance, however, lesser standards of scrutiny should apply. For example,
Justice Breyer noted that regulations of commercial speech are subject to
review under intermediate scrutiny—what he called a “‘lesser’ (but still
elevated) form of scrutiny”—as compared to laws targeting political
speech and speech that either forms or expresses public opinion.339 Furthermore, when ordinary economic and social legislation that only incidentally involves speech is under review, any form of heightened
scrutiny—strict or intermediate—is generally inappropriate, and instead,
a version of rational basis review is warranted.340 As Justice Breyer explained in his dissent on behalf of the four liberal-leaning Justices in
Becerra, “suggesting that heightened scrutiny applies to much economic
and social legislation” does a “serious disservice” to core First Amendment values such as protecting an unfettered marketplace of ideas and its
truth-seeking function.341
The bottom line is that Justice Breyer’s framework for determining
how closely (or, conversely, how loosely and deferentially) courts should
scrutinize statutes implicating speech—an approach that hinges on evaluating whether core First Amendment values are endangered by legislation—provides a possible workaround for Reed’s mandate that strict
scrutiny should apply in cases such as Austin, Doyle, and Otto where
seemingly no harm to core First Amendment values is wrought. If courts
considering the constitutionality of laws barring revenge pornography
and SOCE on minors were to adopt Justice Breyer’s framework, then
they would at least have a viable path for applying a lesser standard of
337. See supra Part III.
338. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
339. Id. Justice Breyer cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), in making this assertation in
Expressions Hair Design. See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring). The test created by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson for evaluating the
validity of laws regulating truthful commercial speech about lawful goods and services is
often said to be a form of intermediate scrutiny. See Corbin, supra note 15, at 1283 (“[T]he
Supreme Court differentiates between commercial speech (such as advertising) and noncommercial speech, and subjects the former to intermediate scrutiny.”); Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 680 n.172
(2015) (observing that in Central Hudson, the Court fashioned “a four-pronged standard of
intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech”).
340. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381–83 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 2382–83.
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review that has been embraced by a current Supreme Court Justice and
courts in Europe. In turn, they would not need to engage in an approach
like that in Austin, where the court both ignored precedent and fashioned
its own novel approaches to bypass strict scrutiny. Courts embracing Justice Breyer’s values-and-interests approach would simply explain, and
then conclude, that fundamental First Amendment values such as safeguarding political speech and promoting truth seeking in the public marketplace of ideas are not endangered by revenge pornography and antiSOCE measures. As noted earlier, Judge Rosenberg in Otto, in fact, took
into account whether core First Amendment values were threatened by
the anti-SOCE ordinances at issue in concluding that intermediate scrutiny might be the best standard to apply.342 This represents a small, encouraging step toward lower court adoption of Justice Breyer’s approach
in low-value speech cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that these are turbulent times when it comes to
selecting scrutiny standards in First Amendment jurisprudence, with U.S.
Supreme Court Justices disagreeing along perceived political lines in
high-profile cases about when heightened inquiry is warranted.343 To wit,
Justice Kagan in 2018 lamented the Court’s conservative Justices
“weaponizing the First Amendment” and turning it “into a sword” by
using heightened scrutiny to strike down “workaday economic and regulatory policy.”344 In that case, Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, the conservatives used heightened
scrutiny to deal a potentially severe financial blow to public-sector labor
unions.345
That same year, Justice Breyer criticized the Court’s conservative
members for “suggesting that heightened scrutiny applies to much economic and social legislation.”346 Justice Breyer derided their scrutiny
methodology for paying “a serious disservice” to traditional First Amend342. See supra notes 298–307 and accompanying text.
343. See generally Clay Calvert, Certifying Questions in First Amendment Cases: Free
Speech, Statutory Ambiguity, and Definitive Interpretations, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1349, 1371,
1173 (2019) (referencing “[t]he rift over scrutiny separating conservative from liberal
[J]ustices,” and noting the “fracturing along political lines on such a fundamental issue as
the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in any given First Amendment case”).
344. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see Aaron Tang, Life After Janus, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 677, 693
(2019) (noting that the Janus majority applied “heightened scrutiny” and that the fairshare fee requirement at issue in the case, which helped to financially sustain public-sector
labor unions, could not surmount that standard).
345. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine L. Fisk, Exaggerating the Effects of Janus: A
Reply to Professors Baude and Volokh, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 42, 42 (2018) (“Janus invalidated thousands of public sector labor-management contracts involving millions of government employees, and may have a substantial adverse effect on union membership and
union revenues in the twenty-two states that allowed government employers to collect fairshare fees from union-represented employees who chose not to join the union.” (footnote
omitted)).
346. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ment goals, such as protecting unpopular opinions from censorship and
promoting a robust marketplace of ideas and its truth-seeking telos.347
The conservative Justices’ decision in National Institute of Family & Life
Advocates v. Becerra to apply heightened scrutiny and enjoin a law that
helped women learn about government-sponsored abortion options is
consistent with Kagan’s weaponization thesis in Janus.348 Many scholars,
in turn, fret about what has been called “the deregulatory use of the First
Amendment in pursuit of a laissez faire, Lochner-style market”349 and
“the cynical use of the First Amendment to circumvent economic
regulation.”350
Yet, as this Article makes clear, lower courts in the 2019 cases of People v. Austin, Doyle v. Hogan, and Otto v. City of Boca Raton actually
defanged—or, at least, weakened—the First Amendment’s power when it
is deployed to challenge laws regulating the seemingly low-value speech
of both revenge pornography and SOCE. In doing so, these courts
greased the legal skids for upholding the measures by ratcheting down
the level of review.
Notably, the courts in these disputes navigated routes that bypassed
Reed v. Town of Gilbert’s mandate that facially content-based laws must
clear strict scrutiny to be constitutional, regardless of a benign legislative
motive.351 In Austin, the Supreme Court of Illinois determined that intermediate scrutiny controlled by ignoring Reed and, in its place, turned to:
(1) Ward v. Rock Against Racism for the pre-Reed rule that the governmental purpose and intent underlying a law determines if it is content
347. Id. at 2383.
348. As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky and Professor Michele Goodwin explain:
In Janus v. American Federation, Justice Elena Kagan in dissent spoke of the
Court “weaponizing the First Amendment.” She was referring to conservatives turning to the First Amendment to strike down economic and social
regulations that they don’t like. That is exactly what happened in NIFLA v.
Becerra: A Court majority that is hostile to reproductive rights used the First
Amendment to invalidate a law that clearly should have been upheld.
Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerrymandering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 124 (2019) (footnote omitted).
349. Claudia E. Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 VAND. L. REV. 501, 504 (2019); see
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (concluding that an individual’s liberty and
freedom of contract trumped the government’s police power to enforce, in the interest of
public health, a labor law limiting the number of hours per week that bakers could work);
see also Richard Blum, Labor Picketing, the Right to Protest, and the Neoliberal First
Amendment, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595, 600 (2019) (noting under Lochner’s
“discredited approach[,] . . . the government was generally prohibited from regulating commercial activity”); Mila Sohoni, The Trump Administration and the Law of the Lochner
Era, 107 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1331 (2019) (“[T]he Lochner era is conventionally (and sometimes nostalgically) associated with notions of limited government and laissez-faire . . . .”
(footnote omitted)).
350. Erica Goldberg, First Amendment Cynicism and Redemption, 88 U. CIN. L. REV.
959, 962 (2019). This approach is also sometimes referred to as First Amendment libertarianism, under which attorneys “seek to use the First Amendment as a deregulatory tool to
invalidate various compulsory laws such as label requirements, antidiscrimination restrictions, or healthcare mandates.” Nikolas Bowie, The Government-Could-Not-Work Doctrine, 105 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019).
351. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (describing this aspect of the holding
in Reed).
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based or content neutral, (2) the secondary effects doctrine, which the
U.S. Supreme Court has narrowly limited to laws regulating the location
of and activities inside of sexually oriented businesses, and (3) a dichotomy separating laws that regulate private speech from those that restrict
expression on matters of public concern.352 This Article exposed
problems with the high court of Illinois’s approach to scrutiny under all
three of these gambits.353
In Doyle, a federal district court in Maryland held that intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate for measuring the validity of a statewide antiSOCE statute, while in Otto, a federal district court in Florida also suggested—albeit, without definitively resolving—that intermediate scrutiny
was applicable for analyzing two local anti-SOCE ordinances.354 The
workarounds for Reed in these cases pivoted on several variables. They
included: (1) the fact that the laws regulated speech only in a limited context where it took on the form of a treatment, thereby pushing it closer to
the conduct end of the continuum between expression and action; (2) the
notion that the laws regulated the speech of licensed professionals speaking within their professional capacities; (3) reliance in Otto on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey; and (4) consideration in Otto of whether the ordinances negatively affected the traditional First Amendment goal of safeguarding a diverse public marketplace of ideas.
Finally, the Article contended that rather than engage in such questionable machinations as the courts did in Austin, Doyle, and Otto, judges
confronting content-based laws that regulate new categories of speech—
ones lacking a long history of regulation and punishment in the United
States and therefore ones that cannot easily be positioned outside the
ambit of First Amendment protection under the Supreme Court’s logic in
United States v. Stevens355—that appear to be of negligible value in serving traditional First Amendment interests should embrace Justice
Breyer’s proportionality approach to scrutiny. Justice Breyer’s approach,
as described in Part V, takes into account the First Amendment values
and interests served by protecting the speech in question, with the level of
scrutiny fluctuating depending on whether core First Amendment interests are imperiled by the legislation.356 It weighs the harms, if any,
wrought to those fundamental values and interests by censoring the
speech against the benefits to society reaped by suppressing it.

352. See supra Section IV.A (addressing and critiquing the Supreme Court of Illinois’s
analysis of the scrutiny issue in People v. Austin).
353. See supra Section IV.A (addressing and critiquing the Supreme Court of Illinois’s
analysis of the scrutiny issue in People v. Austin).
354. See supra Section IV.B.1–2 (addressing and critiquing the federal district court
decisions in both Doyle v. Hogan and Otto v. City of Boca Raton).
355. See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text (addressing Stevens and how it has
been interpreted by scholars).
356. See supra Part V.
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Ultimately, lower-court embracement of Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach to judicial review as a mechanism for evading strict scrutiny—especially in a dispute implicating a hot-button topic such as
revenge pornography or SOCE—when the speech both lacks historical
regulation and is of low value in serving core First Amendment interests
might well tee up for possible Supreme Court reconsideration Reed’s
mandate that facially content-based laws must overcome strict scrutiny.
Justice Breyer’s long-standing endorsement of proportionality, when coupled with the concerns in Janus and Becerra of the Court’s two other
remaining liberal Justices that heightened scrutiny is being unnecessarily
deployed by the Court’s conservative members to attack economic and
social legislation, indicates that mustering the requisite four votes to hear
such a case may be feasible if just one conservative justice agrees to join
them.357 Granting a petition for a writ of certiorari in such a case would
not only afford the Court an opportunity to reexamine Reed but also present it with the chance to address a larger, more profound question. That
macro-level question is whether the Court’s current categorical, tiers-ofscrutiny formula in First Amendment speech cases should be scrapped
and supplanted by the more fluid, proportionality methodology for which
Justice Breyer long has advocated.
Until the Court revisits Reed and its categorial approach, however, one
might reasonably expect to see more courts follow in the footsteps of the
Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Austin and create their own precedent-flouting workarounds for strict scrutiny in low-value speech cases.
The path for escaping the doctrinal lockboxes of Stevens and Reed in order to ease the constitutional burden on regulating low-value speech better rests in Justice Breyer’s values-and-interests approach than in
inventing questionable mechanisms in cases such as Austin.

357. Justice Ginsburg’s death in September 2020 left Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan as the remaining liberals on the Court as of late 2020. Four justices must agree to
hear a case for a petition for a writ of certiorari to be granted. See Richard L. Revesz &
Pamela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067,
1073 (1988) (“[T]he Rule of Four means that the Court will grant certiorari whenever four
Justices vote to do so . . . .”); Ira P. Robbins, Justice by the Numbers: The Supreme Court
and the Rule of Four—Or Is It Five?, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (“When four
Justices vote to review a case, all nine of the Justices are required to consider its merits
absent any intervening factors that were not known or appreciated at the time the petition
was granted.”).

